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DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AS A
VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: APPLICATION OF
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Emily Behzadi*
ABSTRACT
In recent years, armed conflicts around the world have
occasioned widespread destruction of cultural heritage sites.
From the demolition of Palmyra in the Syrian Arab Republic to
the destruction of Sufri Shrines in Mali, the intentional
despoliation of these important cultural heritage sites is not only
an uncontroverted violation of international aw but a form of
cultural genocide. The destruction of cultural heritage
profoundly impacts citizenry on a local, national, and global
level. Cultural heritage is an expression of fundamental and
universally recognized human rights, including rights to
freedom of expression, freedom of thought, freedom of conscience
and religion, and freedom of culture. Despite the importance of
this expression, suing the perpetrators of these wanton attacks in
U.S. courts is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible. While
many plaintiffs have successfully stated a claim under the Alien
Tort Statute for violation of the law of nations, involving
personal injury or death suffered by a foreign plaintiff, the
destruction of property has consistently failed to meet the
stringent legal thresholds imposed by the United States Supreme
Court.
This Article reviews the evolving law pertaining to the Alien
Tort Statute ("ATS") and the challenges posed by its application
to torts against cultural heritage. In light of recent precedent, this
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paper sets forth a bold proposal: Under existing international
law, the destruction of cultural heritage should qualify as a
violation of a norm of the law of nations and thus fall under the
penumbra of the Alien Tort Statute. A discussion of the value of
cultural heritage is particularly important as the United States
grapples with the divisive conversation over the destruction of
confederate monuments. Although the concept of invoking
"universal jurisdiction" is controversial in principle and in
practice, this avenue is necessary to effectively redress the harms
to individuals and cultural groups caused by the destruction of
heritage sites, and in doing so holds accountable those who
commit these crimes against humanity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Why do we feel more pain looking at the image of the destroyed
bridge than the image of massacred people? .. . Perhaps because
we see our own mortality in the collapse of the bridge. We expect
people to die; we count on our lives to end. The destruction of a
monument to civilisation is something else. The bridge in all its
beauty and grace was built to outlive us; it was an attempt to
grasp eternity. ... A dead woman is one of us-but the bridge is
all of us forever.
Croatian writer Slavenka Drakulig1
Over the course of 5,000 years, some 14,000 wars have percolated
history, resulting in, among other human catastrophes, the destruction
of works of art as well as important cultural and archeological sites.2
There are no statistics as to how much cultural heritage has been
destroyed within these 5,000 years.3 The author of the book The Museum
of Lost Art surmises that "more masterpieces than all of the world's
museums combined" have been destroyed.4
Throughout history, the destruction of cultural heritage was treated
as "an inevitable consequence of war."5 It served as a form of overt
oppression and aggression-a tool used by an adversary to eradicate
another people's culture, identity, religion, and history. Over the last
decade, the world has had occasion to idly watch the destruction of
cultural heritage in times of both peace and armed conflict. The
occupation of northern Mali by Al-Qaida-linked and Taureg militants
resulted in the decimation of a vast number of historical, cultural, and
religious sites and objects.6 Firebombs in Djerba, a Jewish neighborhood
1. ROBERT BEVAN, THE DESTRUCTION OF MEMORY: ARCHITECTURE AT WAR 40 (2d.
expanded ed. 2016).
2. JINt TOMAN, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED
CONFLICT xi-xii (1996) (discussing the historical development and providing contemporary
commentary on the rules concerning the protection of cultural heritage).
3. Throughout this Article, the term "cultural heritage" is used as opposed to "cultural
property." The term "cultural heritage" is all-encompassing and includes tangible culture-
including buildings, monuments, books, artworks, artifacts, cultural objects etc., intangible
culture-including language, folklore, traditions, dances, and knowledge, and natural
heritage-including important natural sites, landscapes, biodiversity, fauna, and
ecosystems. Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O'Keefe, "Cultural Heritage" or "Cultural
Property," 1 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 307, 307-08 (1992).
4. NOAH CHARNEY, THE MUSEUM OF LosT ART 7 (2018).
5. TOMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
6. Omar Sacirbey, Timbuktu Artifacts Destroyed in Northern Mali Fighting, WASH.
POST (June 11, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/timbuktu-
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in Tunisia, almost damaged the historic Ghriba Synagogue.7 In Egypt, a
series of deliberate fires devastated a Coptic church and various religious
institutions.8 In Libya, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ("ISIS") extremists
destroyed historic and cultural sites and vandalized Sufi shrines and
graves.9 The world also has witnessed the systematic destruction of
temples, monasteries, shrines, fortified cities, and historic sites at the
hands of ISIS in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq.10 Recently, the
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has yielded the destruction of
cultural heritage.11
These incidents are archetypal examples of the profound impact the
destruction of cultural heritage has had on cultural and religious
communities in various regions throughout the world.
12 It is in this
context that scholars have attempted to fit the destruction of cultural
heritage within the framework of human rights.1 3 Despite the fact that
artifacts-destroyed-in-northern-mali-fighting/2013/06/11/e3bb0cIc-d2c7- 1 1e2-b3a2-
3bf5eb37b9d0_story.html.
7. Dov Lieber, Jewish Sites in Tunisia Firebombed Amid Social Unrest, TIMES ISR.
(Jan. 10, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/historic-tunisian-synagogue-
firebombed-amid-social-unrest/.
8. See Egypt: Series of Fires in Their Churches "Not a Coincidence, "Say Copts, WORLD
WATCH MONITOR (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2019/11/egypt-
series-of-fires-in-their-churches-not-a-coincidence-say-copts/; Egypt: Mass Attacks on
Churches, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 21, 2013, 11:59 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/
08/21/egypt-mass-attacks-churches#.
9. Libya's Cultural Heritage "Being Destroyed and Plundered by Isis,"GUARDIAN (Dec.
15, 2015, 2:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/15/libyas-cultural-
heritage-being-destroyed-and-plundered-by-isis.
10. Andrew Curry, Here Are the Ancient Sites ISIS Has Damaged and Destroyed, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/09/150901-
isis-destruction-looting-ancient-sites-iraq-syria-archaeology/.
11. Dorian Batycka, Armenian Monuments in Line of Fire in Nagorno-Karabakh
Conflict, ART NEWSPAPER (Oct. 26, 2020, 10:53 AM), https://www.theartnewspaper.com/
news/monuments-in-line-of-fire-in-nagorno-karabakh-conflict; Hugh Eakin, When an
Enemy's Cultural Heritage Becomes One's Own, N.Y. TIMES: OP. (Nov. 30, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/1 1/30/opinion/armenia-azerbaijan-monuments.html.
12. Mary Dahdouh, Making the Case for Protecting Cultural Heritage Under the Alien
Tort Statute, INTLAWGRRLS (May 3, 2018), https://ilg2.org/2018/05/03/making-the-case-for-
protecting-cultural-heritage-under-the-alien-tort-statute/.
13. See Patty Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime Against
Property or a Crime Against People?, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 389 (2016)
("Seeing cultural heritage through the lens of human rights assists us in reaching a more
integrated understanding of the role that cultural heritage plays in the lives of human
beings-the local community that lives among the heritage, the regional and national
communities, and the world community."); Francesco Francioni, Beyond State Sovereignty:
The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a Shared Interest of Humanity, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1209, 1212 (2004) ("[T]he concept of human dignity, which informs the human rights
provisions of the Charter and of the Universal Declaration ... includes peoples[']
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the property may itself be the direct fatality of the attack, the intended
victims are humans-individuals making up a distinct ethnic, racial,
social, cultural, or religious group. The destruction of a group's cultural
heritage destroys its members' collective memory, inhibiting their ability
to express culture, religion, and identity, while simultaneously dissolving
connections to their past.14 Cultural heritage is talismanic of an
individual's identity, connecting mind and body to an object as a way of
expressing culture, practicing religion, or connecting to the past.15 By
destroying an individual or group's cultural heritage, an attacker is
committing a violation of the individual or group's right to their culture
or to express their religion. The attack on cultural heritage is therefore a
human rights violation.
The existing international legal framework for the protection of
cultural heritage, while extensive,16 has largely proven unsuccessful at
holding perpetrators accountable on both international and domestic
levels. International forums often lack the authority to issue enforceable
decrees or they are able to only consider claims instituted by states
against other states.17 On a national level, many countries are unable or
unwilling to civilly or criminally hold accountable citizens who
egregiously harm their own cultural heritage.18 Without the presence of
an adequate forum, victims of cultural heritage attacks are unable to
redress the harms that result from the destruction of a piece of their
identity, culture, religion, or history.
entitlement to the respect of the cultural heritage that forms an integral part of their
identity, history and civilization.").
14. See Marcela Jaramillo Contreras, Beyond the Protection of Material Cultural
Heritage in Times of Conflict, in PROTECTING CULTURAL HERITAGE IN TIMES OF CONFLICT
23, 23 (Simon Lambert & Cynthia Rockwell eds., 2010) ("Cultural heritage represents the
identity of a community, and this memory comes from the past, it lives today and is
transmitted to present and future generations. This means that every category of cultural
heritage has something in common: there has to be an identity component that represents
the culture of any community.").
15. See, e.g., Valentina S. Vadi, When Cultures Collide: Foreign Direct Investment,
Natural Resources, and Indigenous Heritage in International Investment Law, 42 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 797, 798 (2011) ("The protection of cultural heritage has profound
significance for human dignity.").
16. See generally Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, T.I.A.S. No. 09-313.1 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention].
17. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, ¶ 1, Oct. 24, 1945 [hereinafter
ICJ Statute].
18. For example, cultural heritage law in Syria is governed by the 1963 Antiquities
Law. Emma Cunliffe, Nibal Muhesen & Marina Lostal, The Destruction of Cultural
Property in the Syrian Conflict: Legal Implications and Obligations, 23 INT'L J. CULTURAL
PROP. 1, 15 (2016). However, any prosecutions for the severe destruction of sites such as
Palmyra and Damascus cannot happen until the conflicts are resolved. See generally id.
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This Article proposes that those victimized by the destruction of
cultural heritage have a strong case for redress in U.S. courts under the
Alien Tort Statute.19 ATS is a jurisdictional statute which allows foreign
plaintiffs to sue foreign defendants in U.S. federal courts for torts
committed in violation of customary international law.20 Recently, a U.S.
district court in Pennsylvania permitted an individual to sue under ATS
for an attack against religious property-a category of cultural
heritage.2 1 In light of this recent development, this Article will examine
the mechanism by which a successful claim for the destruction of cultural
heritage may be brought under ATS. By using ATS, victims may be able
to use the favorable components of the U.S. adversarial system not only
to be compensated for these atrocities, but also to hold perpetrators
individually accountable.
Overall, this Article seeks to frame the intentional destruction of
cultural heritage as a violation of human rights and remove it from the
singular context of harms against property. Part II of this Article
provides an analysis of the criteria by which a court determines whether
a case may be brought under ATS, and offers an overview of how courts
define violations of international norms with a specific emphasis on
property-related torts. Part III discusses the universal and obligatory
nature of the prohibition against the destruction of cultural heritage and
concludes that such a norm is defined as part of the "law of nations" under
ATS. Part IV examines a variety of substantive claims which
practitioners may utilize to confer jurisdiction under ATS. Given the
often-polemic attitudes towards the destruction of confederate
monuments in the United States, Part V necessarily examines the
definition of the destruction of cultural heritage and how that definition
may be applied to U.S. courts. Lastly, Part VI offers context to the
individual harms caused by the destruction of cultural heritage and
provides justification for the use of ATS as a vehicle for relief.
II. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The Alien Tort Statute has been a subject of much contention among
the courts and scholars since its inception in 1789. While it is generally
agreed that the Framers enacted ATS as an avenue for foreign plaintiffs
to seek remedies in the United States for violations of international law,
the extent to which the statute should be applied has triggered
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
20. Filirtiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
21. Jane W. v. Thomas, 354 F. Supp. 3d 630, 637 (E.D. Pa. 2018); Complaint at 31, W.,
354 F. Supp. 3d 630 (No. 18-0569).
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impassioned discourse.22 In 1789, the First Congress enacted the
Judiciary Act, which established the federal court system and
enumerated the requirements for federal court jurisdiction.23 As part of
the Judiciary Act, the First Congress created ATS to provide federal
courts with original jurisdiction over "all causes where an alien sues for
a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."24 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the "law of
nations"25 formed part of both state and federal law.26 This source of
jurisprudence still has a lasting impact on the laws of today. ATS, and
its application of tort law to the violation of the law of nations, remained
largely undisturbed until 1980. An understanding of the case law and the
scholarly discourse surrounding the polemical use of this statute is vital
to establishing that the destruction of cultural heritage is a violation of
international norms that can-and should-be adjudicated under ATS.
A. Filartiga to Kiobel: Defining ATS Litigation
In 1980, the Second Circuit's decision in Fildrtiga v. Pera-Irala27
served as the catalyst for the contemporary application of ATS in federal
courts. In this groundbreaking case, the Second Circuit asserted
jurisdiction over an alleged tort with which the United States had little
to no connection.28 The case involved a civil action brought against
Americo Norberto Pena-Irala ("Pena"), a citizen of Paraguay and the
prior Inspector General of Police in Asunci6n, Paraguay, for the
kidnapping and torturing to death of Joelito Filartiga ("Filartiga").29 The
plaintiff attempted to utilize ATS to assert jurisdiction in the Eastern
District of New York, which dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
22. Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1467, 1467-74 (2014) (reviewing in detail the historical background behind the
inception of the Alien Tort Statute and the forefathers' misgiving toward its enactment).
23. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77.
24. Id.
25. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the "law of nations" was comprised of
laws impacting merchants, maritime law, conflicts of laws, and the laws governing relations
between states. See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law
of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 27-29 (1952).
26. Stephens, supra note 22, at 1470-71; see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,
281 (1796) ("When the United States declared their independence, they were bound to
receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement."); The Nereide, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (noting that the Court was "bound by the law of nations
which is a part of the law of the land.").
27. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
28. Id. at 878-79.
29. Id. at 878.
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jurisdiction.3 0 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that "whenever an
alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within our
borders, § 1350 provides federal jurisdiction."3 I
In forming its opinion, the court concluded that international law
must be interpreted "not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists
among the nations of the world today."32 By examining various sources of
international law, including United Nations declarations and
international treaties, the court concluded that torture universally
violates established norms of international human rights, and thus the
law of nations.33 The court did not specify whether any of.these sources
standing alone is sufficient to establish the existence of well-settled
international law. However, it illuminated the sources which could be
used to consider a norm universal.
34
The court said that ATS did not grant new rights to foreign plaintiffs
but rather only confers federal court jurisdiction to those who seek
adjudication of violations against the law of nations.3
5 Nothing in this
decision created a separate cause of action under ATS. The concluding
remarks of the Fildrtiga court epitomize the importance of its holding:
In the twentieth century the international community has come
to recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard
of basic human rights and particularly the right to be free of
torture. ... In the modern age, humanitarian and practical
considerations have combined to lead the nations of the world to
recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in their
individual and collective interest.. .. Our holding today, giving
effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First Congress,
is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless
dream to free all people from brutal violence.36
30. Id. at 878-80.
31. Id. at 878.
32. Id. at 881 (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796)).
33. Id. at 884.
34. See id. at 880 ("In light of the universal condemnation of torture in numerous
international agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an instrument of official policy
by virtually all of the nations of the world (in principle if not in practice), we find that an
act of torture committed by a state official against one held in detention violates established
norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations.").
35. See id. at 887. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien
Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445 (2011) (expanding on the type
of claims authorized under ATS for federal court adjudication).
36. Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
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The Fildrtiga court's interpretation of ATS is significant in that it opened
up a channel by which victims of human rights abuses are able to pursue
remedies for violations of international law in U.S domestic courts. The
court's language necessarily validates human rights norms and the
importance of the judiciary's power to enforce these norms.
Fildrtiga established the viability of human rights litigation and,
over the next several years, remained the guidepost for cases applying
ATS.37 While claimants rarely received the monetary fruits of these
judgments, their victories symbolized a vindication of their rights-the
courts recognized their suffering, held the perpetrators accountable, and
strengthened the rule of law to deter future similar conduct.38 However,
the contours of the Fildrtiga decision were narrowly applied. Foreign
plaintiffs could only sue for very few human rights abuses and only for so
long as those foreign plaintiffs could obtain personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.39
In 2004, the Supreme Court finally stepped in to consider the modern
application of ATS in the seminal case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.40
Humberto Alvarez-Machain ("Alvarez-Machain"), a Mexican doctor,
allegedly assisted in the torture and murder of an American Drug
Enforcement Agency ("DEA") officer, Enrique Camarena-Salazar, in
Mexico.41 Jose Francisco Sosa ("Sosa"), a Mexican citizen and former
police officer, assisted the DEA in kidnapping Alvarez-Machain for
prosecution in the United States.42 Although Alvarez-Machain was
eventually acquitted for his alleged crimes, the litigation continued.43
Alvarez-Machain filed a lawsuit against the U.S. officials and Mexican
citizens, including Sosa, who were involved in the DEA abduction.44
37. The Supreme Court uniformly rejected to review the merits of ATS cases. See
generally, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzid, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005
(1996); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Hum. Rts. Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 508 U.S. 972 (1993); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
38. See, e.g., Dolly Fildrtiga, Foreword to BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS xvii-xviii (2d ed. 2008) (describing her family's
lawsuit and the court's decision as an "enormous victory for human rights," which ended in
her family's "vindication").
39. Stephens, supra note 22, at 1490. Likewise, the plaintiff must overcome other bars
to suit, including the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the act of state doctrine. See
id. at 1527, 1535.
40. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
41. Id. at 697.
42. Id. at 698; see also Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 609 (2003),
rev'd, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
43. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.
44. Id.
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Notably, Alvarez-Machain pleaded a claim under ATS against Sosa for
violation of the "law of nations" for his unlawful arrest.45
While the majority opinion cited Fildrtiga as precedent, albeit
narrowly, it restricted ATS's applicability by implicitly limiting the types
of violations of international law that could be adjudicated as federal
common-law claims.46 The Justices agreed that ATS was solely a grant of
jurisdiction and did not create any separate federal cause of action.47
However, the Court recognized that the First Congress did not intend the
provision to be a "stillborn."48 The majority acknowledged that the
judiciary retained the power to recognize a cause of action for a "modest"
set of international law violations.49 Nevertheless, the Court cautioned
that such power should be used sparingly50 and the application of ATS
should be limited to only those few cognizable torts that demonstrated
the definiteness and "acceptance among civilized nations" of actions
contemplated by the "18th-century paradigms."51 The Court ultimately
concluded that "arbitrary arrest and detention" was not violative of a
norm of customary international law.52 As the Court cited Fildrtiga with
seeming approval, proponents of ATS saw this case as an affirmation of
the Federal Judiciary's power to recognize common law causes of action
for some human rights violations.53
Nevertheless, Sosa failed to address the extraterritorial application
of ATS,54 an issue that had been previously condemned by the executive
branch.55 After Sosa and subsequent progeny, a new wave of litigation
45. Id. at 699.
46. See id. at 725 (stating that "there are good reasons for a restrained conception of
the discretion a federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this
kind").
47. Id. at 713.
48. Id. at 714.
49. Id. at 720.
50. Id. at 727-28 (explaining that "the potential implications ... of recognizing ...
causes should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the
Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.... Since many attempts
by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of new norms of international law would
raise risks of adverse foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at all, with
great caution.").
51. Id. at 725, 732.
52. Stephens, supra note 22, at 1510 n.237.
53. Id. at 1511.
54. Extraterritorial application means the application of U.S. law abroad. See generally
Jeffrey A. Meyer, Extraterritorial Common Law: Does the Common Law Apply Abroad?,
102 GEo. L.J. 301 (2014) (arguing the limits of extraterritorial application of common law).
55. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush
Administration's Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169,
185-86 (2004) (describing the Bush Administration's concerted efforts to limit human
rights litigation through ATS in the United States).
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ensued in the United States.56 In 2013, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of the extraterritoriality of ATS in the decision of Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.5, In Kiobel, citizens of Nigeria filed a claim against
various foreign corporations for aiding and abetting Nigerian forces for
allegedly committing violations of the law of nations, including the
beating, raping, killing, and arresting of residents and destroying and
looting of property in the Ogoni villages.58 The petitioners alleged that
the corporations "aided and abetted these [purported] atrocities by ...
providing the Nigerian forces with food, transportation, and
compensation" and use of the corporations' property.59 In particular, the
petitioners claimed that the corporations "violated the law of nations by
aiding and abetting the Nigerian Government in committing (1)
extrajudicial killings; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) torture and cruel
treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) violations of the rights
to life, liberty, security, and association; (6) forced exile; and (7) property
destruction."60
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question of
whether a claim under ATS may extend to "conduct occurring in the
territory of a foreign sovereign."61 The foreign corporations contended
that claims under ATS should not reach conduct occurring in the
territory of a foreign sovereign based on the canon of statutory
interpretation commonly known as the presumption against
extraterritoriality.6 2 The canon presumes that the United States governs
domestically and cannot impart its rules on other countries.63 The
majority held that "the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to
claims under the ATS."64 The majority reasoned that this presumption
serves "to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those
of other nations which could result in international discord."65 It further
articulated that the presumption is utilized to avoid "the danger of
56. In particular, cases involving corporate liability under ATS were prevalent after
Sosa. See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011)
(holding that corporations may be held liable under ATS), overruled in part by Jesner v.
Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1406-07 (2018); Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 600
(11th Cir. 2015); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir. 2011).
57. 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
58. Id. at 113.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 114.
61. Id. at 114-15.
62. Id. at 115.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 124.
65. Id. at 115 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
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unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy."66
Justice Roberts's majority opinion concluded by remarking that claims
that "touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with
sufficient force" will "displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application."67 The Court subsequently followed that "mere corporate
presence" is insufficient to displace the exterritoriality presumption
because "[c]orporations are often present in many countries."68 Notably,
the majority's opinion gave no examples of the type of contacts sufficient
to establish this novel requirement.
Prior to Kiobel, the United States was the only country to provide
damages for human rights violations committed abroad.69 The Court
evidently desired to reduce, if not totally eliminate, this American
exceptionalism.70 The Court's reluctance to allow extraterritorial
application of ATS remarkably narrowed the already-thin ability of
plaintiffs to bring human rights actions to federal courts in the United
States. The consequence of this decision is the limited enforceability of
Fildrtiga and the erosion of human rights protections as a whole.
B. Defining the Law of Nations Under ATS
When the First Congress drafted the clause "tort ... in violation of
the law of nations,"71 the type of international norms its members
intended to recognize were notably absent from the legislation. The
legislative history similarly fails to answer the question as to whether
the drafters desired to apply ATS broadly-to all torts-or to only a small
quantum. The initial purpose of ATS was to combat the Continental
Congress's "inability to 'cause infractions of treaties, or of the law of
nations to be punished."'72
Traditionally, only three torts were recognized at common law as
violations of the law of nations, including "violation of safe conducts,
66. Id. at 116.
67. Id. at 124-25 (citing Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)).
68. Id. at 125.
69. Louise Weinberg, What We Don't Talk About When We Talk About
Extraterritoriality: Kiobel and the Conflict of Laws, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 1472-73,
1501 (2014) (examining the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel through the lens of
extraterritoriality and concluding that the holding was wrongly decided).
70. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 123 (noting that "there is no indication that the ATS was
passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of
international norms").
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
72. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716 (2004) (citing JAMES MADISON,
JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 60 (E. Scott ed., 1893)).
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infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy."73 After Sosa,
courts have struggled to restrain themselves in defining a wrong as a
violation of the law of nations.74 Customary international law should
serve as the guide post in determining which international norms are
actionable under ATS.75 The difficulty primarily arises from defining the
contours of customary international law so as to satisfy the court-created
standards of ATS.76 Norms derived from customary international law are
that which have traditionally been defined as general and consistent
practices which "States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense
of legal obligation and mutual concern."77 In the more than two hundred
years since the enactment of the First Judiciary Act, customary
international law has evolved significantly.
Identification of a norm of customary international law generally
requires consideration of "the works or jurists, writing professedly on
public law; . . . the general usage and practice of nations; or 0] judicial
decisions recognizing and enforcing that law."78 The Statute of the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") provides guidance on the type of
sources it is proper to consider in the quest to define a norm of customary
international law.79 Article 38 sets forth the hierarchy of sources that the
ICJ considers in all legal disputes:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;
73. Id. at 724 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND (1769)).
74. See Matt A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether
Transnational Corporations Are Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the Alien Tort Statute, 31
MICH. J. INT'L L. 385, 398-99 (2010).
75. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
76. This article uses customary international law synonymously with the law of
nations. The law of nations, while used frequently in ATS scholarship, is an antiquated
phrase. Federal courts equate "customary international law" with the law of nations. Viet.
Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 323, 248 (2d Cir. 2003)). However, some
scholars opine that the law of nations shares its roots more with jus cogens than with
customary international law. See William J. Moon, The Original Meaning of the Law of
Nations, 56 VA. J. INT'L L. 51, 54 (2016) (opining that the law of nations is best
contextualized "as peremptory rules of international law (jus cogens)," rather than
customary international law).
77. Flores, 414 F.3d at 248.
78. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-161 (1820).
79. ICJ Statute, supra note 17, at art. 38.
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(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.80
International legal instruments are not categorically equal, and some
may have little to no evidentiary weight when classifying the universal
law of nations.81 These sources often contradict one another and thus
further complicate interpretations of international law.82 These
contradictions leave scholars and courts struggling to determine what is
sufficient to meet the high threshold of what constitutes a recognized
norm.83
As there is no systematic test for the interpretation and definition of
customary international law, it is essential to examine the precedents
developed under ATS as means to establish a violation of the law of
nations. As articulated in Fildrtiga, a court "must interpret international
law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the
nations of the world today."84 Therefore, any interpretation of a norm
must be characterized based on contemporary sources. In Sosa, the
Supreme Court explained that a determination of whether a norm is
80. Id. The term "publicist" is now anachronistic and can be synonymous used with
scholars or jurists. See Flores 414 F.3d at 251 n.26 (explaining how nineteenth and
twentieth century scholars differ from contemporary scholars).
81. For example, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists may only serve as "evidence" of principles of customary international law, to
which courts may look "not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law
ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is." The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE
U.S. § 102(3) (AM. L. INST. 1987) (noting that international agreements create customary
international law only "when such agreements are intended for adherence by states
generally and are in fact widely accepted").
82. See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International
Governance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 1996, 2032 (2000) (identifying that "gaps, contradictions, and ambiguities" in sources
of international law require judges to make choices which may legitimatize "bullying" on
an international scale).
83. See generally Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1117 (2011) (providing an analysis for the differing approaches by proponents
and opponents of ATS in regard to the application of international norms).
84. Fildrtiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796)).
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sufficient to support a cause of action under ATS must "involve an
element of judgment about the practical consequences of making that
cause available to litigants in the federal courts."85 As one might expect,
the Supreme Court desired to provide a level of practicality to the
interpretation of an allegedly violative norm-ergo can the violation of
this norm feasibly be adjudicated in the U.S. court system?
From Sosa onward, courts have utilized some version of the
requirement that the law of nations must be "specific," "universal,"
"definable," and "obligatory."86 This generally accepted standard was
conceived in 1981 by law professors Jeffrey Blum and Ralph Steinhardt
in an Article published in the Harvard International Law Journal.87 The
authors, in analyzing the Fildrtiga decision, opined that recognized
international norms must be an "object of concerted international
attention .... definable and identifiable as a tort committed by
individuals[,] .... textually obligatory[, and] .... universal."88 Blum and
Steinhardt's test subsequently became part of contemporary ATS
jurisprudence in the case of Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, where
Judge Edwards, in his concurrence, limited the reach of ATS to those
violations of "definable, universal, and obligatory norms."89
Subsequently, federal district courts and appellate courts around the
United States have reiterated some variation of this language in their
decisions.90
While the language "definable, universal, and obligatory norms" has
been cited uniformly throughout federal district and appellate courts, its
85. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-733 (2004).
86. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1399, 1421 (2018); Abebe-Jiri v.
Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 716
(9th Cir. 1992); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 744, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring).
87. Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV.
INT'L. L.J. 53, 87-89 (1981).
88. Id.
89. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring) (citing Blum & Steinhardt,
supra note 87, at 87-90).
90. See cases cited supra note 86; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp.
1078, 1091 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Granville Gold Tr. v. Commissione Del Fallimento, 928 F. Supp.
241, 243 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995); Guinto
v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531,
1539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Scholars have also cited variations of this language in Articles.
See, e.g., Derek P. Jinks, Note, The Federal Common Law of Universal, Obligatory, and
Definable Human Rights Norms, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMPAR. L. 465, 469-70 (1998). But see
William S. Dodge, Which Torts in Violation of the Law of Nations?, 24 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMPAR. L. REV. 351, 357-59 (2001) (arguing for a more expansive standard).
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successful application is rare.91 As a result, not every tort in violation of
customary international law has been recognized as actionable under
ATS. For example, in Sosa, the Court declined to recognize short term
arbitrary detention as a trigger for tort liability. 92 The Second Circuit has
refused to recognize torts in violation of international law for private
racial or religious discrimination,93 violations of a "right to life" or "right
to health,"94 and the failure to provide consular notification and access
after arrest.95 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit denied a claim for liability for
fraud under ATS.96
A thorough review of case law leaves little doubt that a successful
recognition of a violation of international law stems from an examination
of state practice as opposed to "abstract rights and liberties devoid of
articulable or discernable standards and regulations."97 The culmination
of evidence that is sufficient to establish a norm as definable, universal,
and obligatory is, evidently, an analysis that must be performed on a
case-by-case basis. Appellate courts have advised district courts to
exercise "extraordinary care and restraint" in deciding whether an
offense will violate a customary norm.98 As will be established in the
forthcoming analysis, many international instruments, state
constitutions and laws, and judicial decisions support the contention that
the norms prohibiting the destruction of cultural heritage are definable,
universal, and obligatory so as to be considered within the law of nations.
C. Property-Related Torts and the Alien Tort Statute
ATS was enacted with the particular purpose of providing a remedy
for injuries suffered by British subjects, which in turn may have
disrupted renewed trade with Great Britain.99 The trade-promoting
function of ATS justified private remedies to aliens who had suffered
91. Many courts expanded upon this language but retain some of variation of this
common definition. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2009)
(determining whether a norm is considered part of the law of nations by whether the norm
alleged "(1) is a norm of international character that States universally abide by, or accede
to, out of a sense of legal obligation; (2) is defined with a specificity comparable to the 18th-
century paradigms discussed in Sosa; and (3) is of mutual concern to States").
92. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 736-38 (2004).
93. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 448 (2d Cir. 2000).
94. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 254 (2d Cir. 2003).
95. De Los Santos Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 208 (2d Cir. 2008).
96. Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995).
97. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999).
98. Flores, 414 F.3d at 248.
99. Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 830, 882 (2006).
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noncontract injury to their person or property.100 Indeed, what the First
Congress "likely had in mind in enacting the ATS was injury suffered by
loyalists who returned to the United States and were 'molested' by locals
in their attempts to recover family land or property as provided for in the
1783 Treaty of Peace."101 Notwithstanding the historical reasoning
behind the statute's enactment, there is a dearth of precedential case law
that confers ATS jurisdiction on individuals seeking remedies for
property-related injuries. This paucity illuminates the reluctance of
courts to recognize cases involving non-personal injury related torts as a
way to curtail application of ATS.
One of the first contemporary cases to attempt to utilize ATS for
property-related torts is Dreyfus v. Von Finck.102 The plaintiff, a Jew and
former resident of Germany, sought recovery from West German citizens
for alleged wrongful misappropriation of property in Nazi Germany
during World War 11.103 The court disagreed with the plaintiff's assertion
that the defendants' seizure of plaintiff's property was a tort in violation
of the law of nations.104 The court held that ATS could not form a basis
for jurisdiction where the treaties upon which the plaintiff bases a tort
claim-the Hague Convention, the Kellog-Briand Pact, the Versailles
Treaty, and the Four Power Occupation Agreement-do not provide an
express, individual right of action to enforce the general rights granted
therein. 105 Seemingly wary of the potential precedential impact this case
may have on property-related ATS cases, the court erroneously added an
extra layer to this analysis, notwithstanding that the prohibition against
100. Thomas H. Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien Tort Statute: The Evolving Role of the
Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1645, 1651-52 (2014).
101. Id. at 1654 (emphasis added). Article V of the 1783 Treaty of Peace recommended
to the legislatures of states to "provide for the Restitution of all Estates, Rights and
Properties, which have been confiscated belonging to real British Subjects ... [a]nd that
Persons of any other Description shall have free [l]iberty . . . to obtain the Restitution of
such of their Estates, Rights and Properties as may have been confiscated . ... And that
Congress shall also earnestly recommend to the several States, that the Estates, Rights
and Properties, of such last mentioned Persons hall be restored to them, they refunding to
any Persons who may be now in Possession . . . ." Treaty of Peace, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. 5,
Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
102. 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
103. Id. at 26.
104. Id. at 30. The court's is an assertion with which this author emphatically disagrees.
For an analysis of the recognition of the seizure of property as forbidden under customary
international law, see Emily T. Behzadi, "Spain for the Spaniards": An Examination of the
Plunder & Polemic Restitution of the Salamanca Papers, 11 GEO. MASON INT'L COM. L.J. 1,
32-40 (2020).
105. Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 30.
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the seizure of property is undoubtedly "universal, definable, and
obligatory."106
In Orkin v. Swiss Confederation,107 the plaintiff sought return of a
Van Gogh drawing that the plaintiff's great-grandmother was allegedly
forced to sell to a Swiss art collector to ostensibly fund her family's escape
from Nazi Germany.108 In seeking return of the painting, the plaintiff
asserted jurisdiction under ATS, claiming that the forced sale and
retention of the painting constituted violations of the law of nations.
109
The court held that the plaintiff cited no authority to support his claim.110
Instead, the Second Circuit relied on IT v. Vencap, Ltd.,111 an opinion in
which Judge Friendly proclaimed "[w]e cannot subscribe to plaintiffs'
view that the Eighth Commandment 'Thou shalt not steal' is part of the
law of nations."112
The facts of Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran,113 demonstrate the
reluctance of federal courts to involve themselves in the actions of state
governments, particularly in the case of property-related issues. In
Jafari, expatriate Iranian citizens claimed that the revolutionary
government of Iran had improperly expropriated private property
belonging to them.114 Relying on Dreyfus, the court held that
expropriation of private property by the revolutionary government of
Iran would not constitute a tort in violation of the law of nations.115 The
court asserted that "the 'law of nations' does not prohibit a government's
expropriation of the property of its own nationals."116 Instead, the court
emphasized that while expropriation of property may be foreign to the
American way of life, it is "not so universally abhorred that its prohibition
106. See, e.g., THE L. OF WAR ON LAND art. 54 (INST. INT'L L. 1880) [hereinafter Oxford
Manual] ("Private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, must be
respected, and can be confiscated only under the limitations contained in the following
articles."); Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 47, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention] ("Pillage is formally
prohibited."); Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6 § (b), Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1546 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter] (including the "plunder of public or private
property" as a "War crime").
107. 444 F. App'x 469 (2d Cir. 2011).
108. Id. at 470; Orkin v. Swiss Confederation, 770 F. Supp. 2d 612, 613-14 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
109. Orkin, 444 F. App'x at 471-72.
110. Id. at 472.
111. Id.
112. 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
113. 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
114. Id. at 210.
115. Id. at 215.
116. Id. (citing Filirtiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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commands 'the general assent of civilized nations."'117 The court further
highlighted the sharp conflict of views that exist in the world as to
expropriation, mainly between capitalist and socialist nations, stating
"[w]e cannot elevate our American-centered view of governmental taking
of property without compensation into a rule that binds all 'civilized
nations."'
118
In 2003, the Southern District of New York had occasion to analyze
the issue of whether the confiscation of property without just
compensation violates the law of nations for purposes of ATS.119 In
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., plaintiffs
brought an action against Talisman Energy, Inc. and Sudan, alleging
violations of international law stemming from allegations of gross human
rights violations, including extrajudicial killing, forcible displacement,
war crimes, confiscation and destruction of property, kidnapping, rape,
and enslavement.120 The court declined to recognize that confiscation
without just compensation violates the law of nations for purposes of a
claim under ATS.121 However, the court found that "expropriation or
property destruction, committed as part of a genocide or war crimes, may
violate the law of nations."122
While courts have traditionally accepted the notion that a domestic
taking by a sovereign state does not implicate international law,123 courts
have recognized that the expropriation of property as a target of genocide
may invoke the law of nations outside the ATS context. This was true in
the Seventh Circuit case of Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank,124 where
Holocaust survivors and heirs sued several Hungarian banks and the
117. Id. (quoting Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 881).
118. Id.
119. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
120. Id. at 296.
121. Id. at 324.
122. Id. at 325.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937) ("What another country
has done in the way of taking over property of its nationals, and especially of its
corporations, is not a matter for judicial consideration here. Such nationals must look to
their own government for any redress to which they may be entitled."); FOGADE v. ENB
Revocable Tr., 263 F.3d 1274, 1294 (11th Cir. 2001) ("As a rule, when a foreign nation
confiscates the property of its own nationals, it does not implicate principles of international
law."); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing
De Sanchez v. Banco Cent. De Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir. 1985)) ("[E]xpropriation
by a sovereign state of the property of its own nationals does not implicate settled principles
of international law."); De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1397 ("At present, the taking by a state of
its national's property does not contravene the international law of minimum human
rights.").
124. 692 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2012).
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Hungarian national railway, alleging that the banks and the national
railway participated in the expropriation of property from Hungarian
Jews during the Holocaust.125 The expropriations alleged by plaintiffs in
this case included "the freezing of bank accounts, the straw-man control
of corporations, the looting of safe deposit boxes and suitcases . . . , and
... charging third-class train fares to victims being sent to death camps,"
which all functioned as a "part of the genocidal plan to depopulate
Hungary of its Jews."126 The court held that the domestic takings
exception did not apply, as the property expropriated was pursuant to
and was an integral part of a widespread campaign to deprive Hungarian
Jews of their wealth and to fund genocide, a long-recognized violation of
international law.127 While not invoking ATS, the case is illustrative of
the close relation between property-related torts and international
humanitarian law.
The district court in Kiobel also questioned whether property damage
committed as part of genocide or war crimes would be violative of the law
of nations.128 The district court accepted Judge Allen G. Schwartz's
reasoning in Presbyterian Church that "property destruction committed
as part of genocide or war crimes, and not property destruction alone,
violates the law of nations."129 However, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the wanton destruction of their real and personal property
constituted "discriminatory confiscation and destruction of property in
violation of customary international law."130 The court seemingly
suggested that if the plaintiffs had alleged genocide or war crimes in
combination with the property destruction, the claims would not have
been dismissed.131 The inference that can be extrapolated from this
decision is that property-related torts may be considered a violation of
customary international law so long as they are framed within a certain
125. Id. at 666. To be clear, this is not an ATS case, but rather the plaintiffs attempted
to invoke jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")'s expropriation
exception. Id. Like ATS, a claim of sovereign immunity raises a jurisdictional defense, not
a substantive claim on the merits. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700
(2004). For a thorough analysis of expropriation cases under the FSIA, see generally Ronald
Mok, Comment, Expropriation Claims in United States Courts: The Act of State Doctrine,
the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. A Road Map
for the Expropriated Victim, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV. 199 (1996).
126. Abelesz, 692 F.3d at 675.
127. Id. at 675-76.
128. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464 (S.D. N.Y. 2006),
aff'd in part on other grounds, rev'd in part on other grounds, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010),
aff'd, 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
129. Id. at 464 (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 2d 289, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
130. Id. (citing Amended Complaint at ¶ 115).
131. Id. ("Plaintiffs have not alleged genocide or war crimes.").
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context-namely genocide as a war crime-not just as an attack on
property alone but as a part of or an instrument of an attack on people.
Courts have sporadically endorsed the destruction of property as a
sufficiently established or universally recognized violation of
international law. However, on the rare occasion the courts have
addressed the issue, the claim has been anchored within the broader
context of international humanitarian law. With the juxtaposition of
these normative concepts as background, this Article will examine the
destruction of cultural heritage within the parameters of international
humanitarian law and develop a standard which may be applied broadly
to establish certain ATS claims.
III. THE UNIVERSAL AND OBLIGATORY NATURE OF THE PROHIBITION
AGAINST THE DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE
A. The Early History
The roots of the destruction of cultural heritage can be traced back to
the classical era, where conquering armies would destroy historic and
cultural sites and monuments as a symbol of victory.132 The destruction
of cultural heritage thus was a form of cultural or ethnic cleansing, in
which the destroyer removed a group's link to its own community and
erased any memory of the group's existence. These barbaric practices
were universally prevalent, resulting in the loss of innumerable objects,
sites, and monuments. In antiquity, there were generally no widely
recognized rules that prohibited the destruction of enemy property.133
The lack of any regulatory scheme sanctioned the destruction of the
Temple of Enlil in Mesopotamia in 2250 BCE by King Narim-Sin, the
burning and sacking of the Acropolis by the Persians in 479 BCE, and
the destruction of the Temple of Solomon in Jerusalem in 70 CE.134 As
articulated by JirH Toman, the destruction of cultural heritage became
"an inevitable consequence of war."135
132. See generally MARGARET M. MILES, ART AS PLUNDER: THE ANCIENT ORIGINS OF
DEBATE ABOUT CULTURAL PROPERTY (2009).
133. PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW 711 (4th ed. 2019).
134. Id. at 711-12.
135. TOMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
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Ancient scholars later acknowledged that the destruction of sacred
sites was wasteful. The Greek historian Polybius (202-120 BCE)
reinforced this idea, writing:
The laws and the right of war oblige the victor to ruin and destroy
fortresses, forts, towns, people, ships, resources and all other
such like things belonging to the enemy in order to undermine
his strength while increasing the victor's own. But although some
advantage may be derived from that, no one can deny that to
abandon oneself to the pointless destruction of temples, statues
and other sacred objects is the action of a madman.136
While the Roman Republic and Empire continued this practice,
137 it
also tended to show some respect for religious sanctuaries. 138 During the
prosecution of Roman magistrate Gaius Verres, the Roman statesman
and philosopher Cicero did not condemn these wartime practices;
however, he did recommend moderation and selflessness in acts of
despoliation that did not enrich or embellish the victors' homeland.
139
During the struggle between the Goths and the armies of the Eastern
Roman Empire, the Byzantine General Belisarius, announced a more
radical view, urging:
Building works of art in a city can only be the undertaking of wise
men who know how to live with civility; whereas destroying
existing ones can only be the work of lunatics who are not
ashamed of going down in history as such .... [B]y destroying
Rome, you will not have destroyed someone else's property but
your own . . .140
136. Id. at 4.
137. Derek Fincham, Intentional Destruction and Spoliation of Cultural Heritage Under
International Criminal Law, 23 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 149, 153 (2017). The
destruction of cultural treasures during the Roman Empire is well-documented. Most
notably, the Arch of Titus in Rome showcases the looting and destruction of the Second
Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE by Titus, the son of the Roman Emperor Vespasian. Id. For
an image of this depiction, see Ruth Schuster, Archaeologists Reconstruct How the Arch of
Titus Looked-in Full Color, HAARETZ (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.haaretz.coml
archaeology/MAGAZINE-archaeologists-reconstruct-how-the-arch-of-titus-looked-in-full-
color-1.5449144.
138. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 133, at 712.
139. TOMAN, supra note 2, at 4.
140. Pietro Verri, The Condition of Cultural Property in Armed Conflicts (I): From
Antiquity to World War II, INT'L REV. RED CROSS, No. 245, Apr. 1985, at 67, 75.
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After reading this letter, Totila, the King of the Goths, resolved to not
inflict any further damage on Rome.141
Destruction of cultural heritage was not limited to periods of armed
conflict. History has revealed that acrimony toward ideology and
theology has oftentimes resulted in the destruction of cultural heritage.
The Byzantine Empire is historically known for its iconoclasm, in which
the government mandated the destruction of religious images and
artifacts.142 During the Reformation, England, Germany, France, and the
Netherlands similarly participated in iconoclastic activities.143 The
destruction and desecration of art and architecture during these times
served as a powerful statement against those who were theologically
opposed to their views.144
It was not until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that the
protection of cultural heritage became a topic of serious debate among
scholars of international law. Polish jurist Jacob Przyluski expressed the
idea that belligerents should accord all works of art, not only those of
religious character, with respect.145 Thereafter, Emmerich de Vattel in
his famous work, The Law of Nations, expounded the theory that:
For whatever cause a country is ravaged, we ought to spare those
edifices which do honour to human society, and do not contribute
to increase the enemy's strength,-such as temples, tombs, public
buildings, and all works of remarkable beauty. What advantage
is obtained by destroying them? It is declaring one's self an
enemy to mankind, thus wantonly to deprive them of these
monuments of art and models of taste .... 146
141. Id. at 75-76.
142. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (S.D. Ind. 1989) ("During the period of Iconoclasm ... ,
government edicts mandated the destruction of religious artifacts so that such religious
'images' would not be the subject of veneration. These iconoclast edicts were responsible for
the destruction of many significant religious artifacts.").
143. David Freedberg, The Structure of Byzantine and European Iconoclasm, in JOHN
HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 619, 619 (5th ed. 2007).
144. See Fincham, supra note 137, at 154-55.
145. TOMAN, supra note 2, at 4-5. Jacob Przyluski was arguably the first to express this
idea although writers such as Alberic and Justin Gentilis afterward agreed with this
contention. Id.; Stanislaw-Edward Nahlik, Protection of Cultural Property, in U.N. ED., SCI.
AND CULTURAL ORG., INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW at 203 (1988).
146. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, WITH THREE EARLY
ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF NATURAL LAW AND ON LUXURY 571 (Bela Kapossy
& Richard Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2008) (1797).
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The scholar and architect Quatremere de Quincy published in 1796 open
letters criticizing Napol6on's spoliation of Italy's art.147 He claimed that
this art formed part of common European cultural heritage and
expressed that "no one has the right to dispose arbitrarily of it."148
On the other hand, sixteenth century political philosopher Niccolo
Machiavelli took a different position. He advocated that a ruler of a
conquered city is entitled to destroy said city not only to eliminate the
conquered cultural identity and memory, but also to prevent future
rebellions.149 Hugo Grotius, known as the father of international law,
similarly prescribed the old ideas, expressing: "it is permitted to harm an
enemy, both in his person and in his property; that is, it is permissible
not merely for him who wages war for a just cause, . . . but for either side
indiscriminately."150
These early writings served as the theoretical undertone of early
international instruments that are the basis of the contemporary
prohibition against the destruction of cultural heritage. The defeat of
Napol6on in the nineteenth century, and the devastation left in its wake,
revealed a shortcoming in the laws of warfare. Prevailing sentiments no
longer considered the right of enemy forces to misappropriate private
property; instead, such acts were contrary to the laws of warfare of
civilized nations. Accordingly, the nineteenth century served as the
catalyst for modern rules in place today, which regulate the protection of
cultural heritage.
B. Contemporary International Instruments and the Destruction of
Cultural Heritage
Influenced by writers from Polybius to Vattel, the Prussian-
American political scientist Francis Lieber151 introduced the first legal
147. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 11 (5th Ed.
2007). The looting during the Napoleonic Wars is a spoilation of the cultural treasures. See
ANDREW McCLELLAN, INVENTING THE LOUVRE: ART, POLITICS, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
MODERN MUSEUM IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PARIS 1-2 (1994). The contents of Napoleon's
conquest can still be seen at the Louvre in Paris. See id. For a more thorough investigation
of the systematic confiscations of cultural heritage during the Napoleonic Wars, see id.
(chronicling the formation of the Louvre during the Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire).
148. MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 147, at 11.
149. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 133, at 713.
150. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 349-50 (Stephen C. Neff ed.,
Francis W. Kelsey et al. trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012); Andrew Blom, Hugo Grotius
(1583-1645), INTERNET ENCYC. OF PHIL., https://iep.utm.edu/grotius/ (last visited Apr. 7,
2021).
151. Francis Lieber was a Prussian soldier who witnessed the battle of Waterloo and
fought in the Greek War of Independence. Paul Finkelman, Francis Lieber and the Modern
Law of War, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 2071, 2078-79 (2013). He moved to the United States and
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instrument to prohibit the destruction of cultural heritage during armed
conflict.152 The so-called "Lieber Code," a collection of army regulations
governing the conduct of the Union Army during the American Civil War,
introduced penal provisions for the destruction of cultural heritage
during armed conflict. 153 The Lieber Code pays particular attention to the
categorization of property, characterizing it as "private" unless used for
a military purpose.154 Article 35 emphasizes the need to protect cultural
heritage, specifically "[c]lassical works of art, libraries, scientific
collections, or precious instruments" from "all avoidable injury, even
when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or
bombarded."155 In recognition of cultural heritage as something worthy
of protection, the Lieber Code also prohibits its destruction in Article 44:
"all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer ...
[is] prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other severe
punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense."156
The Lieber Code influenced the development of military law in
countries outside the United States, including France, Germany, Great
Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia, and Spain.157 The Lieber Code also became
a point of reference for subsequent unratified international agreements,
became a professor at Columbia University. Id. For more information on Francis Lieber's
background, see generally JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN'S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (2012) (providing an in-depth examination of the creations of the laws
of war from the American perspective).
152. War Dep't, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field (Apr. 24, 1863) (promulgated as General Order No. 100 by President Abraham
Lincoln) [hereinafter Lieber Code]; Finkelman, supra note 151, at 2109; see also Patty
Gerstenblith, From Bamiyan To Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of Cultural
Heritage at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 245, 249-59 (2006)
(providing historical context of the early history of the law warfare regarding cultural
heritage sites and objects).
153. Lieber Code, supra note 152, arts. 34-35, 44; see John C. Johnson, Under New
Management: The Obligation to Protect Cultural Property During Military Occupation, 190/
191 MIL. L. REV. 111, 119 (2006-07) (providing an overview of the importance of the Lieber
Code to military treatment of cultural property).
154. See Lieber Code, supra note 152, arts. 34, 38. In particular, article 34 states:
As a general rule, the property belonging to churches, to hospitals, or other
establishments of an exclusively charitable character, to establishments of
education, or foundations for the promotion of knowledge, whether public schools,
universities, academies of learning or observatories, museums of the fine arts, or
of a scientific character-such property is not to be considered public property ....
Id. art. 34.
155. Id. art. 35.
156. Id. art. 44.
157. Pietro Verri, The Condition of Cultural Property in Armed Conflicts (II): From
Antiquity to World War II, INT'L REV. RED CROSS, No. 246, June 1985, at 127, 128-29
(outlining and providing comparisons from the Lieber Code to the English Code, the Italian
Code, the Spanish Code, and the Russian Code).
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which extolled the prohibition of the destruction of cultural heritage,
including the Brussels Declaration158 and the Oxford Manual of the
Institute of International Law.159 The legal precedent set by the Lieber
Code and subsequent declarations influenced the codification of the
international protection of private property-including cultural
heritage-in the 1899160 and 1907161 Hague Conventions.
Article 27 of the 1899 Hague Convention stresses the necessity of
taking steps to spare "edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and
charity, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected,
provided they are not used at the same time for military purposes."16 2
Implicitly, Article 27's requirement to protect cultural heritage also
denotes the obligation to refrain from its destruction. Eight years later,
the convention and its regulations were revised at the Second
International Peace Conference in 1907.163 The language of Article 27
and its enforceability remained untouched by the subsequent
amendments.164 While some scholars believe that the 1899 and 1907
Hague Conventions are weak in their enforceability1 65-citing the vast
destruction of cultural heritage during the First World War and Second
World War-in actuality, they aid in the interpretation of the prohibition
158. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War,
art. 8, Aug. 27, 1874 ('The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences even when State property, shall be
treated as private property. All seizure or destruction of, or willful damage to, institutions
of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science should be made the subject
of legal proceedings by the competent authorities.").
159. Oxford Manual, supra note 106, at art. 53 ("The property of municipalities, and that
of institutions devoted to religion, charity, education, art and science, cannot be seized. All
destruction or willful damage to institutions of this character, historic monuments,
archives, Works of art, or science, is formally forbidden, save when urgently demanded by
military necessity.").
160. See 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 106, at art. 56.
161. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 56, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention].
162. 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 106, at art. 27.
163. Convention (II) with Respect o the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899,
INT'L COMM. RED CROSS: TREATIES, STATES PARTIES & COMMENTS., https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/150 (last visited July 14, 2020).
164. See id. Although, it should be noted that seventeen of the states that ratified the
1899 Convention did not ratify the 1907 version: Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Greece, Italy, Korea, Montenegro, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Serbia, Spain, Turkey,
Uruguay, Venezuela. Id. These states and their successors remain bound by the 1899
Hague Convention. Id.
165. See, e.g., Gerstenblith, supra note 13, at 341 ("Despite the widespread acceptance
of these conventions by European nations, the conventions failed to protect cultural
property during the two world wars.").
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against destruction of cultural heritage as a fundamental rule embodied
in customary international law.166
In 1935, the Seventh International Conference of American States
recommended the ratification of the Roerich Pact, which reiterated the
obligation to respect and protect cultural property.167 The Roerich Pact
also initiated the use of a distinctive flag for marking the monuments and
institutions protected under the agreement.168 Around the same time, the
League of Nations' International Museums Office sought to expand the
protection of cultural property during armed conflict through the drafting
of the International Convention for the Protection of Historic Buildings
and Works of Art in Times of War.169 The Draft Convention echoed the
sentiments of previous instruments but also attempted to expand the
protection of cultural heritage by prohibiting the use of monuments of
artistic or historic interest for any purpose which may subject them to
attack.170 Despite these honorable attempts, neither document was able
to thwart the damage to cultural heritage in World War II, which
resulted in the largest destruction and displacement of cultural sites and
objects known to humanity.171
After World War II, the international community desired to create
more effective laws regulating the destruction of cultural heritage in
order to prevent this type of carnage in the future. While the drafters of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not delineate any new provisions
prohibiting the destruction of cultural heritage, the Fourth Geneva
Convention reinforced the provisions of the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions.172 The first real international instrument with innate
166. Karima Bennoune (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights), Rep. of the
Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/59, at 14 (Feb. 3,
2016) (quoting Francesco Francioni & Federico Lanzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas
of Bamiyan and International Law, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 619, 635 (2003)) ("The Special
Rapporteur recalls that many provisions of the Hague Convention are deemed to rise to the
level of customary international law, binding both States not party to the Convention as
well as non-State actors. She further concurs with experts that 'the prohibition of acts of
deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of major value for humanity' rises to the level of
customary international law.").
167. Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic
Monuments art. 1, Apr. 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267 [hereinafter Roerich Pact].
168. Id. art. 3.
169. Preliminary Draft International Convention for the Protection of Historic Buildings
and Works of Art in Times of War, 19 LEAGUE NATIONS OFF. J. 885 app. at 937 (1938).
170. See id. at 938.
171. See generally LYNN NIcHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA (1994).
172. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 53, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention] ("Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property
belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public
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enforceability did not occur until 1954 with the adoption of the
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict at The Hague, Netherlands.173 The 1954 Hague Convention was
the first international treaty exclusively focused on the protection of
cultural heritage during times of armed conflict. 174 The 1954 Hague
Convention recognized that "damage to cultural property belonging to
any people whatsoever" is "damage to the cultural heritage of all
mankind."175 The 1954 Hague Convention solidified the notion that the
prohibition of destruction of cultural heritage is recognized by customary
international law by implementing measures that prohibit the
destruction of cultural heritage,176 require the safeguard of cultural
heritage,177 and impose sanctions on those who breach the provisions of
the convention.178 By recognizing that "the preservation of the cultural
heritage is of great importance for all peoples of the world,"179 the
convention elevates the prohibition of the destruction of cultural heritage
to a matter of international significance.
After the 1954 Hague Convention, additional developments
materialized in international humanitarian law, specifically relating to
cultural heritage and armed conflict. The vast destruction in the former
Yugoslavia180 necessitated the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") to re-examine the 1954 Hague
Convention. As a result, UNESCO drafted and adopted the Second
Protocol, which set forth obligations for signatories to enact national
legislation making the destruction of cultural heritage a criminal
offense1 81 and applied such obligations to international and non-
international conflicts.18 2 The establishment of the 1948 Universal
authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such
destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.").
173. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 16.
174. 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/armed-conflict-and-
heritage/convention-and-protocols/1954-hague-convention/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
175. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 16, at pmbl.
176. Id. art. 4.
177. Id.
178. Id. art. 28. ("The High Contracting Parties undertake to take, within the framework
of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal or
disciplinary sanctions upon those persons, of whatever nationality, who commit or order to
be committed a breach of the present Convention.").
179. Id. at pmbl.
180. See infra Section III.C.
181. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 15, Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769 [hereinafter
Hague Convention Second Protocol].
182. Id. art. 22.
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Declaration on Human Rights ("UDHR")183 and the 1996 International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR")184 also
was instrumental in the development of the protection of cultural
heritage. The UDHR and ICESCR reiterated the importance of
"scientific, literary or artistic production" to individuals and recognized
that such rights should not be infringed.185
These preceding international instruments demonstrate that the
international community generally recognizes that cultural heritage
cannot be destroyed without cause,186 and any such occurrence may lead
to liability.
C. The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: An International Crime
While the law of armed conflict has traditionally fixated on inter-
state conflicts, international law has had to account for the evolving
nature of international and non-international conflicts.187 International
conventions alone cannot prevent-and have not prevented-the
continual destruction of cultural heritage by individuals who target such
property with impunity.188 This is an area where international law can
183. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 27 (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR] ("1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural
life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its
benefits. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.").
184. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, at art. 15 (Dec 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR] ("1. The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the
benefits of scientific progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from the protection of the
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of
which he is the author. 2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present
Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the
conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture. 3. The States
Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for
scientific research and creative activity. 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the benefits to be derived from the encouragement and development of
international contacts and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields.").
185. Id.; UDHR, supra note 183, at art. 27.
186. See, e.g., 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 16, at art. 4(2) ("The obligations
mentioned in paragraph 1 ... may be waived only in cases where military necessity
imperatively requires such a waiver.").
187. Fincham, supra note 137, at 179.
188. See Anne-Marie Carstens, The Hostilities-Occupation Dichotomy and Cultural
Property in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 52 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (2016) ("[W]ell-
entrenched prohibitions prove woefully ineffective against the current scourge for several
reasons. First and foremost, rules based on good-faith adherence cannot protect the
'cultural heritage of mankind' in conflicts where belligerents flagrantly violate these rules
and target cultural property precisely for its cultural connotations.") (emphasis omitted).
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be utilized as an instrument to resolve this paradigm. When prosecuting
an individual for destruction of cultural heritage, two avenues for
prosecution may be undertaken: crimes against humanity or war
crimes.189 By invoking the aid of international criminal tribunals, a body
of international criminal law has developed as an attempt to hold
accountable those who destroy or damage cultural heritage.
Individual criminal responsibility for unlawfully directing attacks
against cultural heritage is universally recognized under international
law. 190 The first development of criminal liability for crimes against
cultural heritage arose after World War II during the Nuremberg Trials,
which occasioned the prosecution of individuals for various war crimes as
well as crimes against humanity.191 The Charter of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg vested international jurisdiction for
those war crimes including "plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity."192 One of the first individuals to be prosecuted for
crimes against cultural heritage, among other crimes, was Alfred
Rosenberg, who was instrumental in the organization of the "Einsatzstab
Rosenberg," the arm of the Third Reich charged with the despoliation of
cultural heritage.193 The Nuremberg Indictment also charges multiple
individuals with the destruction of "industrial cities, cultural
monuments, scientific institutions, and property of all types in the
occupied territories to eliminate the possibility of competition with
Germany."194
During the 1990s, the mass atrocities during the Balkan wars
necessitated action by the United Nations Security Council.
195 The
conflicts, which arose after the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, resulted in the systematic destruction of
189. See Roger O'Keefe, Protection of Cultural Property Under International Criminal
Law, 11 MELB. J. INT'L L. 339, 341 (2010).
190. See id. at 346.
191. Fincham, supra note 137, at 165.
192. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 106, at art. 6(b).
193. 1 INT'L MIL. TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 70-71, 293-95 (1947), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd
/MilitaryLaw/pdf/NTVol-I.pdf.
194. Id. at 56. The destruction of cultural heritage devastated Eastern European
countries. The Nazi systematic policy of ethnic and cultural cleansing occasioned the
decimation of 1,710 cities, including over 6,000,000 buildings, 427 museums, 1,670 Greek
Orthodox Churches, 237 Roman Catholic Churches, 67 chapels, and, notably, 532
synagogues. Id. at 58-59.
195. Fincham, supra note 137, at 165 ("With the mass atrocities which took place in the
Balkan wars .. . , the United Nations Security Council created international criminal
tribunals for each conflict.").
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centuries-old mosques, churches, monasteries, libraries, archives, and
artworks in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.196 Similar to the Nazis'
actions in World War II, the destruction of cultural heritage served as an
attempt to eradicate all discernable traits of the culture of "enemy"
communities.197 The United Nations Security Council created the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") to
hold "perpetrators accountable for their crimes in accordance with
international standards of due process; to build a truthful record of the
horrific criminal acts; and to deter future atrocities."198 In an effort to
prosecute crimes against cultural heritage, the Statute of the ICTY
included a provision regarding the destruction of "institutions dedicated
to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic
monuments and works of art and science" as a subcategory of "Violations
of the laws or customs of war" under Article 3(d).199 This marked the first
time an international criminal court was given jurisdiction over this
particular crime,200 and as a result multiple individuals were charged for
the massive destruction left in their wake.20 1
The events of the Balkan conflict and the construction of the ICTY
Statute informed the drafters of the Rome Statute of the International
196. See O'Keefe, supra note 189, at 344.
197. Id.; Dubrovnik and Crimes Against Cultural Heritage, U.N. INT'L CRIM. TRIBUNAL
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, https://www.icty.org/en/outreach/documentaries/dubrovnik-and-
crimes-against-cultural-heritage (last visited July 14, 2020).
198. Jane E. Stromseth, The International Criminal Court and Justice on the Ground,
43 ARIz. ST. L.J. 427, 429-30 (2011).
199. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 3(d),
May 25, 1993 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
200. Mark S. Ellis, The ICC's Role in Combatting the Destruction of Cultural Heritage,
49 CAsE W. RsRV. J. INT'L L. 23, 43 (2017).
201. See Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment, ¶¶
71-72; T¶ 77-83 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2002), https://
www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodanmilosevic/ind/en/mil-ai021023.htm (charging Milosevi6
with, inter alia, multiple counts of destruction of or willful damage to religious, historical,
and cultural buildings and monuments); Prosecutor v. Karadiid, Case No. IT-95-5-I,
Indictment, 1¶ 37-39 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 1995), https://
www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/ind/en/kar-ii950724e.pdf (charging Karadii6 and Mladid for
"widespread and systematic damage to and destruction of Muslim and Roman Catholic
sacred sites"); Prosecutor v. Stanis6, Case No. IT-08-91-T, Judgment Summary, Count 1
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 27, 2013), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/
zupljaninstanisicm/tjugen/130327-summary.pdf (charging the defendants with "[w]anton
destruction of town and villages, including destruction or wilful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion and other cultural buildings"); Prosecutor v. Joki6, Case No. IT-01-42/
1-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶T 8, 116 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18,
2004), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/miodragjokic/tjug/en/jok-sj040318e.pdf (sentencing
Joki6 to seven years imprisonment for, among other things, the "destruction or wilful
damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the arts and
sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science").
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Criminal Court ("ICC")202 to prosecute crimes against cultural
heritage.203 The ICC recognizes that "all peoples are united by common
bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage."204 In
recognition of the importance of cultural heritage, the ICC's prosecution
of "war crimes" includes "[i]ntentionally directing attacks against
buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable
purposes, [and] historic monuments."205 The Rome Statute explicitly
declares that the violations against cultural heritage, whether of non-
international or international character, fall under the umbrella of the
ICC's jurisdiction.206 The broad language of the Rome Statute implies
that any attack against cultural heritage is an international crime,
irrespective of whether or not harm occurs.
207
The first and only ICC case to focus entirely on the destruction of
cultural heritage was the case of Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi.20 8 On December
17, 2015, Al Mahdi was charged with the war crime of destroying Mali's
cultural heritage, including intentionally directing attacks against
Timbuktu's mausoleums and other historical monuments and buildings
dedicated to religion.209 Al Mahdi pleaded guilty to the crimes,210 and
became the first individual to be convicted of international war crimes
for the destruction of cultural heritage.211 This conviction reinforced the
202. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
203. O'Keefe, supra note 189, at 345.
204. Rome Statute, supra note 202, at pmbl.
205. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(ix).
206. Id. art. 8(2)(b), (e)-(f).
207. See id.
208. See Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence, ¶
11 (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/courtrecords/cr2016_07244.pdf.
209. Id. at 1¶ 2, 10-11. The ICC Prosecutor described the impact of the loss to Mali's
cultural heritage, stating:
To destroy Timbuktu's mausoleums is therefore to erase an element of collective
identity built through the ages. It is to eradicate a civilisation's landmark. It is the
destruction of the roots of an entire people, which irremediably affects its social
attitudes, practices and structures. [An] inhabitant of Timbuktu summarised this
notion as follows: "Timbuktu is on the verge of losing her soul; Timbuktu is
threatened by outrageous acts of vandalism; Timbuktu is being held under a
sharpened blade ready for use in a cold-blooded murder."
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Trial Hearing, 19 (Aug. 22, 2016), https:/
/www.icc-cpi.int/Transcripts/CR2016_05767.PDF.
210. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Trial Hearing, 7 (Aug. 22, 2016),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Transcripts/CR2016_05767.PDF.
211. ICC Finds Malian Extremist Guilty of War Crime in Destroying Historic Sites in
Timbuktu, UN NEWS (Sept. 27, 2016), https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/09/
541172#:-:textThe%20International%20Criminal%20Court%20(ICC,heritage%20as%20
a%20war%20crime.
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severity of the crime of cultural heritage destruction and highlights the
importance of the international community's role in safeguarding the
world's cultural heritage.
Jurisdiction under the ICC is only triggered in those countries which
are a party to the treaty or consent to the court's jurisdiction.212 Many of
the world's nations, with major centers of cultural heritage, including the
United States, India, and China have not joined the ICC.213 While there
are a number of international criminal tribunals capable of adjudicating
cultural heritage disputes, the prosecution of criminal offenses can only
work with the participation of the world's most powerful countries.
Despite the Al-Mahdi conviction and the evolution of international
criminal law, the destruction of cultural heritage continues to be a
pervasive global issue. Accordingly, deterrence and redress must be
effectuated through both criminal and civil liability.
IV. THE SUBSTANTIVE CLAIM: DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE
UNDER ATS
As illustrated in the foregoing analysis, the prohibition against the
destruction of cultural heritage is embodied in customary international
law. While ATS clearly affords jurisdiction over claims based upon
international norms recognized under customary international law,
courts may nevertheless be apprehensive to hold actionable such claims
of broad applicability. Indeed, courts have afforded only a limited number
of violations of international norms recognition as within the law of
nations. The application of international law already inspires judicial
reluctance. Still, by articulating certain human rights claims, plaintiffs
may prevail through a judicial finding of a violation of the law of nations.
A. War Crimes
A cause of action for war crimes is perhaps the strongest vehicle for
redress for the destruction of cultural heritage under ATS. Under
international law, war crimes are defined by the Geneva Conventions, to
which the United States, in addition to at least 180 states, is a party.214
212. See Rome Statute, supra note 202, at art. 126.
213. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT'L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-epi.int/
en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%2
Ostatute.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
214. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 172, at art. 147; see also PELL, COMM.
FOREIGN RELS., CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30 (1984) ("[T]he Geneva
Conventions, to which the United States and virtually all other countries are Parties ...
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War crimes are also among those crimes of "universal concern" according
to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States.215 By ratifying the Geneva Conventions, Congress has formally
adopted a universally accepted definition of war crimes.
216 Domestic law
in the United States also recognizes war crimes as a distinct federal
crime, incorporating the definitions of the Geneva Conventions.
217 This
recognition under U.S. domestic law clearly demarcates congressional
intent to include the commission of war crimes as a defined violation of
the law of nations.
The destruction of cultural heritage constitutes a "war crime" under
multiple provision in the War Crimes Act of 1996.218 War crimes are
initially defined as any conduct that constitutes a "grave breach in any
of the international conventions signed at Geneva 12 August 1949, or any
protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party."
219 The
"extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly" is
enumerated in the First Geneva Convention220 and Second Geneva
Convention.221 The Fourth Geneva Convention extends this prohibition
to:
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal
property belonging individually or collectively to private persons,
or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or
cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such
destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations.222
generally reflect customary international law."); Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949., INT'L COMM. oF THE RED
CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xpviewStates=XPages_
NORMStatesParties&xptreatySelected=380 (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
215. RESTATEMENT, supra note 81, § 404.
216. In re Xe Servs., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 582 (E.D. Va. 2009) ("Claims for violations of
the international norm proscribing war crimes are cognizable under the ATS. By ratifying
the Geneva Conventions, Congress has adopted a precise, universally accepted definition
of war crimes.").
217. War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441.
218. See id.
219. Id. at (c)(1).
220. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 50, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114.
221. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 51, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3217.
222. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 172, at art. 53.
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Through ratification of these provisions in domestic legislation,
almost every country in the world, including the United States, has
agreed to include the destruction of cultural heritage under the umbrella
of war crimes. Indeed, war crimes are considered criminally punishable
by the ICC by over 110 states, including Australia, Canada, Japan,
Mexico, and all of Western Europe.223 The War Crimes Act further
defines a "war crime" as conduct "prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28
of the . . . [1907] Hague Convention."224 These provisions, inter alia,
prohibit the destruction of an enemy's property,225 necessitate the
protection of "buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable
purposes, [or] historic monuments,"226 and forbid pillaging.227 Congress's
carve out of provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention that relate to the
prohibition against the destruction and misappropriation of property
demonstrates its explicit recognition of the significance of these
prohibitions and further aids in the embodiment of these prohibitions as
part of customary international law.
Courts have recognized the category of "war crimes" as sufficiently
specific, obligatory, and universal to give rise to a cause of action under
ATS. 228 However, there is only one case that has recognized the war
crime of destruction of cultural heritage as actionable under ATS-Jane
W. v. Thomas.229 On July 29, 1990, Moses Thomas, a former commander
of a specialized branch of the Armed Forces of Liberia, ordered his troops
to murder approximately 600 unarmed men, women, and children taking
refuge in St. Peter's Lutheran Church.230 The massacre was one of the
223. Rome Statute, supra note 202, at art. 8; The States Parties to the Rome Statute,
supra note 213.
224. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(2).
225. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 158, at art. 23(g).
226. Id. art. 27.
227. Id. art. 28.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 85-97. Kadic v. Karadzi, 70 F.3d 232, 242-43
(2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) ("The liability of private individuals for committing war
crimes has been recognized since World War I and was confirmed at Nuremberg after World
War II . . . and remains today an important aspect of international law."); Bigio v. Coca-
Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 448 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing id. at 243) ("[W]ar crimes and acts of
genocide are actionable under the Alien Tort Claims Act without regard to state action
.... "); In re Chiquita Brands Int'l., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2011), rev'd
sub nom. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014) ("War
crimes are recognized violations of the law of nations under the ATS."); In re Xe Servs., 665
F. Supp. 2d 569, 582 (E.D. Va. 2009) ("Claims for violations of the international norm
proscribing war crimes are cognizable under the ATS."); see also Mujica v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding war crimes
actionable under ATS based on the Geneva Conventions and their incorporation into the
War Crimes Act of 1996).
229. 354 F. Supp. 3d 630, 639 (E.D. Pa. 2018); Complaint, supra note 20, at 31.
230. Complaint, supra note 20, at 1-2.
560
2021] DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE
most horrific attacks on civilians in the country's history, and yet,
Thomas and his forces managed to evade accountability for over thirty
years.231 On February 12, 2018, four Liberian survivors of the
massacre232 filed a case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging
several claims for war crimes and crimes against humanity under ATS.233
In the plaintiffs' ninth claim for relief, the Complaint alleged that Moses
Thomas committed a war crime by "intentionally directing attacks
against a building dedicated to religion or a charitable purposes that was
not a military target at the time of the attack."234 In considering a motion
to dismiss the complaint, the court found that the plaintiffs' ATS claims
sufficiently "touch[ed] and concern[ed]" the United States to "displace the
general presumption against jurisdiction over extraterritorial claims ."235
The court in Jane W. v. Thomas did not examine whether the war
crime of the destruction of cultural heritage was sufficiently universal,
definable, and obligatory. However, the court's tacit acceptance of this
claim is demonstrative that this type of claim is actionable under ATS.
The case affirms Judge Schwartz's holding in Presbyterian Church that
"property destruction, committed as part of genocide or war crimes, may
violate the law of nations."236 A claimant's ability to bring such claims,
however, is significantly narrowed to destruction of cultural heritage
within the context of armed conflict. To wit, to meet this threshold of
international liability for war crimes, the actions must be triggered by an
armed conflict.237 The destruction of cultural heritage may inevitably
occur during a conflict of non-international nature or may occur
episodically during peacetime. As such, victims of these attacks must
seek alternative claims under ATS. The destruction of cultural heritage
is not only a war crime, but a human rights violation. Therefore, victims
may be able to seek justice through other humanitarian claims under
customary international law.
231. Id. at 2.
232. The victims survived the Lutheran Church Massacre "by hiding under piles of dead
bodies." Id. They "witnessed the slaughter of hundreds of civilians, including their own
family members." Id.
233. Id. at 2-3. To be clear, the destruction of cultural heritage was only one of many
claims set forth by the claimants in this action. Id. at 19-32.
234. Id. at 31.
235. Jane W. v. Thomas, 354 F. Supp. 3d 630, 639 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
236. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 325
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
237. See supra Section III.B. See also, e.g., Complaint, supra note 20, at 26-27; ICTY
Statute, supra note 198, at art. 3.
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B. Crimes Against Humanity
Crimes against humanity are undoubtedly a violation of customary
international law and, as such, constitute a universal, obligatory, and
definable norm actionable under ATS. 238 Indeed, every modern
international criminal tribunal has articles prohibiting crimes against
humanity.239 While the original concept of the crime against humanity
arose out of acts committed during armed conflicts, the concept has been
extended to times of peace.240 Under international law, crimes against
humanity require (1) "a widespread or systematic attack directed against
[a] civilian population" and (2) a prohibited act.241 The articles defining
238. See Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1154 (E.D. Cal. 2004) ("The prohibition
of crimes against humanity has been defined with an ever greater degree of specificity than
the three 18th-century offenses identified by the Supreme Court and that are designed to
serve as benchmarks for gauging the acceptability of individual claims under the ATCA.");
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Plaintiffs here have alleged
several claims . . . that form the least controversial core of modern day [ATS] jurisdiction,
including allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and racial discrimination.");
Kadic v. Karadi6, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[W]e hold that ... Karadzid may be
found liable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in his private
capacity.").
239. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 202, at art. 7; Control Council for Germany Law
No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against
Humanity art. II(1)(c), Dec. 20, 1945, 15 DEP'T STATE BULL. 829 [hereinafter Control
Council] (prohibiting crimes against humanity); Nuremberg Charter, supra note 106 at art.
6(c) (prohibiting crimes against humanity); S.C. Res. 955, annex, Statute of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]
(prohibiting crimes against humanity); ICTY Statute, supra note 198, at art. 5 (prohibiting
crimes against humanity); Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity art. I(b), opened for signature Nov. 26, 1968,
754 U.N.T.S. 73 (recognizing the existence of crimes against humanity as violations of
international law).
240. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Deference Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 140 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdee/en/51002.htm ("[T]here is no logical or
legal basis for this [armed conflict nexus] requirement and it has been abandoned in
subsequent State practice with respect to crimes against humanity."); see also Control
Council, supra note 238, at art II(c) (neglecting to mention any requirement for an armed
conflict to constitute a crime against humanity); ICTR Statute, supra note 238, at art. 3
(neglecting to reference any sort of nexus requirement for armed conflict); Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (prohibiting genocide, a type of crime against
humanity, "in time of peace or in time of war").
241. See Rome Statute, supra note 202, at art. 7(1); ICTY Statute, supra note 198, at art.
5; ICTR Statute, supra note 238, at art. 3; see also Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506
SI, 2006 WL 2455752 at *3 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (quoting Cabello v. Fernandez-
Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1161 (11th Cir. 2005)) (defining the general elements of crimes
against humanity as "a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population"); In re Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2011),
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crimes against humanity in the respective international instruments
include a list of specific acts constituting crimes against humanity,242 as
well as a more encompassing "[o]ther inhumane acts" provision, which
may include acts "causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health."243
None of the statutes explicitly include the destruction of cultural
heritage, or any property for that matter. Consequently, a claim under
crimes against humanity must fall within the scope of "other inhumane
acts." The International Law Commission "recognized that it [is]
impossible to establish an exhaustive list of the inhumane acts which
might constitute crimes against humanity."244 However, the absence of
the destruction of cultural property as an explicit crime against
humanity is not dispositive of its status. Given that the destruction of
cultural heritage causes great suffering and serious injury to mental
health, scholars have argued that these actions constitute crimes against
humanity.24
The right to one's culture is intrinsically interconnected with the
culture's specific tangible and intangible heritage. The UDHR recognizes
every individual's right to the realization of their "social and cultural
rights" and "the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the[ir]
community."246 Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that
"[p]rotected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their
persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and
practices, and their manners and customs."247 The right to one's cultural
rev'd, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Intl, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014) ("Crimes
against humanity include murder, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer, torture,
rape or other inhumane acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against
a civilian population."); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(quoting Rome Statute, supra note 202, at art. 7) (defining crimes against humanity under
The Rome Statute "as any of certain enumerated acts that are prohibited by international
law 'when committed as part of widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack"').
242. This list specifically includes murder, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer,
torture, rape, or other inhumane acts "committed as part of a widespread and systematic
attack directed against any civilian population .... " Rome Statute, supra note 202, at art.
7.
243. Id. at 7(1)(k); see also ICTY Statute, supra note 198, at art. 5(i); ICTR Statute, supra
note 238, at art. 3(i).
244. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth
Session, 51 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n.
245. See, e.g., O'Keefe, supra note 189, at 380-82; Fincham, supra note 137, at 167; see
also Ann Marie Thake, The International Destruction of Cultural Heritage as a Genocidal
Act and a Crime Against Humanity, 10 ESIL CONF. PAPER SERIES 1, 22-24 (2017).
246. UDHR, supra note 183, at arts. 22, 27(1).
247. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 172, at art. 27.
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life is further documented in the ICESCR, which places on parties the
obligation to take all the steps "necessary for the conservation, the
development and the diffusion of science and culture."248
Cultural heritage is an indispensable resource for individuals to
enjoy and cultivate their culture. The destruction of cultural heritage,
while aimed to harm the physical structure or artifact itself, more
potently harms the targeted cultural group. It deprives members of the
targeted group the ability to express their identity, while simultaneously
dehumanizing them by removing the core of their being.249 It is for this
reason that international law makes clear that this cultural destruction
constitutes a crime against humanity, specifically when it is "widespread
or systematic."250 Indeed, the ICTY has held that when such destruction
is "perpetrated with the requisite discriminatory intent, [it] amounts to
an attack on the very religious identity of a people. As such, it manifests
a nearly pure expression of the notion of 'crimes against humanity,' for
all of humanity is indeed injured by the destruction of a unique religious
culture and its concomitant cultural objects."251
By viewing the destruction of cultural heritage as a crime directed
against individuals, courts have the ability to provide redress for those
victims deprived of their cultural rights outside of the war-time context.
Through this characterization, a strong argument may be made that a
claim under ATS is actionable where the perpetrators destroy cultural
heritage in an attempt to extinguish a group's culture. The destruction of
culture either by property or personhood often has the same motive-to
eradicate a culture and to eviscerate the group's ability of self-
identification. There is a deep-rooted connection between cultural
heritage and cultural rights. When the destruction of cultural heritage is
248. ICESCR, supra note 179, at art. 15(2).
249. See, e.g., U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,
at 71, 74, 113-14 (1949) (indicting defendant for crimes against humanity for the
persecution of Jews through the destruction of cultural heritage, including cultural objects,
libraries, and Polish memorials and the "[s]ystematic destruction of Polish culture, robbery
of Polish cultural treasures and germanization of the Polish country and population"); see
also Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence, ¶T 79-80
(Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/courtrecords/cr2016_07244.pdf (considering
witnesses' testimonies that the destruction of the sites at Timbuktu was "aimed at breaking
the soul of the people of Timbuktu," the court looked at the "symbolic and emotional value"
of these sites for the people of Timbuktu and concluded that Al Mahdi's crime was of
significant gravity).
250. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreskid, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 336, 544 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/
kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj00 114e.pdf.
251. Prosecutor v. Kordi6, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 207 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic_cerkez/tjug/en/
kor-tj010226e.pdf.
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part of a systematic and discriminatory policy against a particular group,
it leads to a violation of innate cultural rights vested by customary
international law and international instruments. UNESCO deems this
crime a form of "cultural cleansing," involving a strategy by the
perpetrator "to destroy the legitimacy of the other, deprived of his
fundamental right of existence and expression."252 Therefore, in cases
where all elements of a crime against humanity are satisfied, the
destruction of cultural heritage should be actionable under ATS, when it
is carried out with a discriminatory intent and severely deprives the
victims of their cultural rights.
C. Cultural Genocide
The destruction of cultural heritage has been viewed as a genocidal
act.25 3 However, courts have categorically failed to recognize "cultural
genocide" as prohibited under customary international law.
254 Cultural
genocide, as a concept of international law, is a sub-category of genocide,
which may be subdivided by physical, biological, economic, political, and
cultural properties.255 In contrast to physical and biological genocide,
cultural genocide entails the destruction of both tangible-such as places
of worship, libraries, or museums-and intangible-such as language
and dances-cultural structures.256  International law recognizes
252. UNESCO International Conference, Heritage and Cultural Diversity at Risk in Iraq
and Syria, 9 (Dec. 3, 2014) (quoting Ambassador Pierre Morel).
253. See generally Rasa Davidaviciite, Cultural Heritage, Genocide, and Normative
Agency, J. APPLIED PHIL., 2020, https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12473 (providing an analysis of
the treatment of cultural heritage destruction as genocide).
254. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 518, 525 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (finding that environmental tort claims alleged as cultural genocide were insufficient
to meet the Fildrtiga standards); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167-68
(5th Cir. 1999) (holding that cultural genocide is not prohibited under customary
international law).
255. David L. Nersessian, The Razor's Edge: Defining and Protecting Human Groups
Under the Genocide Convention, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 293, 297 (2003).
256. Fincham, supra note 137, at 151; see also Hannibal Travis, The Cultural and
Intellectual Property Interests of the Indigenous Peoples of Turkey and Iraq, 15 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 415, 473-74 (2009) (concluding that the attacks on the cultural and
intellectual heritage of indigenous Assyrians,- Greeks, and Armenians of Iraq and Turkey
constitute cultural genocide); Barry Sautman, "Cultural Genocide" and Tibet, 38 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 173, 176-77, 182 (2003) (examining cultural genocide in Tibet); Laurelyn Whitt & Alan
W. Clarke, Bringing It Home: North American Genocides, 20 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 263,
275-80 (2017) (contending that the history of settler colonialism in North America includes
genocidal acts).
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biological and physical genocide as a prohibitive norm but fails to
acknowledge cultural genocide.257
The exclusion of cultural genocide as an unrecognized norm of
customary international law likely derives from the failure of the drafters
of the Genocide Convention to incorporate such a crime.258 Polish jurist
Rafael Lemkin, who provided some of the theoretical underpinnings of
the Genocide Convention, envisioned the crime of genocide to include the
destruction of cultural heritage.259 In writing that destruction of cultural
heritage should trigger universal jurisdiction, Lemkin wrote:
An attack targeting a collectivity can also take the form of
systematic and organized destruction of the art and cultural
heritage in which the unique genius and achievement of a
collectivity are revealed in fields of science, arts and literature.
The contribution of any particular collectivity to world culture as
a whole, forms the wealth of all of humanity, even while
exhibiting unique characteristics.
In the acts of barbarity, as well as in those of vandalism, the
asocial and destructive spirit of the author is made evident. This
spirit, by definition, is the opposite of the culture and progress of
humanity. It throws the evolution of ideas back to the bleak
period of the Middle Ages. Such acts shock the conscience of all
humanity, while generating extreme anxiety about the future.
For all these reasons, acts of vandalism and barbarity must be
regarded as offenses against the law of nations.260
Indeed, earlier drafts of the Genocide Convention proposed
criminalization of cultural genocide, which was understood to include the
destruction or eradication of specific characteristics of a protected group,
including its cultural heritage.261 The crime of cultural genocide was
ultimately rejected by the UN General assembly, as "the destruction of a
257. See Daphne Anayiotos, The Cultural Genocide Debate: Should the UN Genocide
Convention Include a Provision on Cultural Genocide, or Should the Phenomenon Be
Encompassed in a Separate International Treaty?, 22 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 99, 124-25 (2009).
258. Id. at 114-15.
259. See id. at 102-03, 114-15; RAPHAEL LEMKIN, ACTS CONSTITUTING A GENERAL
(TRANSNATIONAL) DANGER CONSIDERED AS OFFENCES AGAINST THE LAW OF NATIONS (Jim
Fussell trans.,1933), http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/madridl933-english.htm.
260. LEMKIN, supra note 258.
261. U.N. Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, art. I(II)(3),
U.N. Doc. E/447 (Mar. 28, 1947).
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group's cultural attributes did not rise to the level of physical destruction,
the main concern of the Convention."26 2
The ICTY considered whether discriminatory attacks on cultural
heritage constitute evidence of genocidal intent in Prosecutor v. Radislav
Krsti and concluded that:
[C]ustomary international law limits the definition of genocide to
those acts seeking the physical or biological destruction of all or
part of the group. Hence, an enterprise attacking only the
cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order
to annihilate these elements which give to that group its own
identity distinct from the rest of the community would not fall
under the definition of genocide.
263
The ICJ has similarly questioned whether cultural heritage
destruction fits within the definition of genocide. In Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, the court held:
[T]he destruction of historical, cultural and religious heritage
cannot be considered to constitute the deliberate infliction of
conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical
destruction of the group. Although such destruction may be
highly significant inasmuch as it is directed to the elimination of
all traces of the cultural or religious presence of a group, and
contrary to other legal norms, it does not fall within the
categories of acts of genocide .... 264
Cultural genocide is undoubtedly a form of erasure, aiming to
eradicate the social and cultural elements of a group of people. Cultural
genocide may be defined as a subset of crimes against humanity as
"inhumane acts" committed against a civilian population and
persecutions on racial or religious grounds.26S While international law
does not recognize cultural genocide as singularly cognizable as an
international law violation, it may fall under the purview of a norm
262. STEVEN R. RATNER, JASON S. ABRAMS & JAMES L. BISCHOFF, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROcITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 33
(3d ed. 2001).
263. Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 580 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-
tjo10802e.pdf.
264. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 47, ¶ 344 (Feb. 26).
265. See Control Council, supra note 229, at art. II(1)(c).
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prohibiting racial and religious discrimination.266 Systematic racial
discrimination by a state may violate a jus cogens norm.267 If such racial
discrimination gives rise to a claim of apartheid,26 8 it may be cognizable
under ATS.269 A fact pattern illustrative of this normative concept arises
from the destruction of cultural heritage that occurred during South
Africa's apartheid regime. District Six, formerly a multiracial area near
Cape Town, was declared a "whites-only" area under South Africa's
Group Areas Act in 1966.270 As part of this systematic discriminatory
operation, the District Six docks were flattened in order to keep races
separate.271 The destruction of heritage in pursuance of this type of
blatantly discriminatory policy may provide a nexus for an actionable
ATS claim. The use of this type of "cultural genocide" under ATS as a
vehicle to rectify the wanton destruction of a group's cultural heritage,
may be a step toward reclaiming racial and ethnic identity and
dismantling structures that use cultural heritage destruction as a form
of racial discrimination.
266. Richard L. Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act:
A Practical Assessment, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 545, 632-33 (2000) (citing multiple authorities to
support the author's contention that racial and religious discrimination falls under cultural
genocide and should be actionable under ATS, contending that "cultural genocide is an
extreme example of discrimination, [so] plaintiffs may have a claim for discrimination even
where the acts at issue do not rise to the level of cultural genocide").
267. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 81, § 702(f) & cmt. a (recognizing "systematic racial
discrimination" as a violation of international law and as among "those human rights whose
status as customary law is generally accepted").
268. Rome Statute, supra note 202, at art. 7(2)(h) (defining the "crime of apartheid" as
"inhumane acts ... committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic
oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and
committed with the intention of maintaining that regime").
269. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007),
aff'd sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (vacating the
district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' ATS claims for aiding and abetting apartheid);
see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 81, § 702 cmt. i ("Racial discrimination is a violation of
customary law when it is practiced systematically as a matter of state policy, e.g., apartheid
in the Republic of South Africa.").
270. Christiaan Beyers, The Cultural Politics of "Community" and Citizenship in the
District Six Museum, Cape Town, 50 ANTHROPOLOGICA 359, 359-60 (2008); Steven C.
Myers, Myth and Monument in the New South Africa, 10 INTERSECTIONS 647, 672 (2009).
271. Robert Bevan, 10 Heritage Sites Lost to Disaster and War, GOOGLE ARTS &
CULTURE, https://artsandculture.google.com/story/kALyuo79hhrkLQ (last visited July 15,
2020). District Six was a particularly important neighborhood culturally. See Beyers, supra
note 270, at 359. For this reason, it was rebuilt, and a museum is now housed in this section
of Cape Town. See id.
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D. Right to Property
The universality of the right to property in domestic and
international law should also provide redress for cultural heritage
destruction under ATS. Noted property law scholar John Sprankling
adopts the view that the right to property does exists not only
domestically, but also on an international level.272 According to
Sprankling, transformative economic and political changes over the last
three decades have helped developed an evolution of international law
that recognizes a "global right to property."273 Enshrined in the principles
of natural law theory is the theory that the right to property is baked
within those pre-existing natural rights of all.274 Of course, the United
States holds property interests in high regard, as rights to property are
enmeshed in American constitutional law.275
The UDHR also acknowledges the right to property and also
advances the notion that no one should be divested of their property.
276
In particular, Article 17 provides: "(1) Everyone has the right to own
property alone as well as in association with others" and "(2) no one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his property."277 Since the Cold War, a majority
of the world's states are parties to human rights treaties which contain a
"right to property,"278 including the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,279 the American Convention
on Human Rights,280 the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
272. John G. Sprankling, The Global Right to Property, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 464,
465-66 (2014).
273. Id. at 466.
274. Id. at 468; see also JOHN LoCKE, TWo TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 289 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) ("The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to
govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind who
will but consult it, that being all equal and inde-pendent, no one ought to harm another in
his Life, Health, Liberty or Possessions.").
275. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.").
276. UDHR, supra note 183, at art. 17.
277. Id.
278. Sprankling, supra note 272, at 475-76.
279. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 ("Every natural or legal person is entitled
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the
general principles of international law.").
280. American Convention on Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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Rights,281 and the Arab Charter on Human Rights.282 Additionally,
almost every member state of the United Nations protects the right of
property under national law.283
As articulated by Sprankling, customary international law generally
limits the expropriation of property.284 Sprankling even goes so far to say
"that the right to property should be recognized as customary
international law."285 The right to property is often considered in
connection with human rights. As a human right, the right to property is
"fundamental in nature."286 Human rights are considered in a "superior
position among the norms of international law." 287 Victims of cultural
heritage destruction may capitalize on this international recognition of
the right to property as a human right. As articulated throughout this
Article, cultural heritage is attached to an individual and community's
personhood and identity. This attachment o cultural heritage provides
certain proprietary rights over what is deemed part of their identity, and
by extension, part of their property. The destruction of cultural heritage,
thus, is an expropriation of the property deemed to belong to a certain
nation, community, or individual.
While there is no reported ATS case that has utilized the right to
property as its own cause of action, the broad breadth of statute, and the
American devotion to the right to property in general, may provide a
strong strategy for human rights advocates.
V. CONTEXTUALIZING THE DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE IN U.S.
DOMESTIC COURTS
The adjudication of ATS claims against cultural heritage destruction
reveals a fundamental question-namely, how should U.S. courts decide
whether an object is considered "cultural heritage?" How we define
"culture" is essential to this analysis. Professor Patty Gerstenblith
considers culture to be an "amalgam" of "ethnicity, language, religion, or
particular history."288 While a cultural group can be associated with a
281. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 14, June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 217.
282. Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 25, adopted May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 INT'L
HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005); Sprankling supra note 272, at 476.
283. Sprankling, supra note 272, at 484.
284. Id. at 491-92.
285. Id. at 497.
286. See id. at 478.
287. Id. (quoting OLIVIER DE ScHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS, COMMENTARY 60 (2010)).
288. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 133, at 19.
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particular country or region, it is frequently much smaller.
289 The
classification of cultural heritage considers an object's cultural, racial, or
ethnic characteristics as it relates to a group of people. Laws pertaining
to cultural heritage seek to protect works of "culture," namely objects that
have artistic, archeological, anthropological, ethnological, or historical
interests. However, the manner in which courts define cultural heritage
is subject to an imperious dichotomy-an object's importance and
symbolism may be important to one group but may be offensive, if not
oppressive, to another.
For example, a divisive conversation about the cultural and historical
value of confederate monuments has taken center stage in U.S.
politics. 290 Equal rights activists have torn down, defaced, and destroyed
confederate monuments because these monuments are said to glorify
white supremacy and memorialize an insurgent government who
ardently advocated for the perpetuation of slavery.291 These statues serve
as a reminder of the continued oppression and disenfranchisement of
African Americans in the United States, as well as the American heritage
of racism and subjugation.292 The destruction of these statues offers
African Americans the opportunity to not only repudiate the ideals that
the statues represent, but also effectuate catharsis for the centuries of
pain they have endured.293 Not surprisingly, there are many who argue
that these confederate monuments are symbolic of "Southern 'pride,'
'heritage' or 'culture"' and thus should not be destroyed.
294 The
methodology of defining cultural heritage in U.S. courts becomes
particularly vexing given that the Trump Administration issued an
289. Id.; see also Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of
Possessing Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J.L.
& JURIS. 249, 254 (1993).
290. For a comprehensive list of all of the confederate monuments that have been
destroyed or removed, see Camille Squires, All the Monuments to Racism That Have Been
Torched, Occupied, or Removed, MOTHER JONES (June 12, 2020), https://
www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/06/all-the-monuments-to-racism-that-have-
been-torched-occupied-or-removed/.
291. Miles Parks, Confederate Statues Were Built to Further a "White Supremacist
Future," NPR (Aug. 20, 2017, 8:31 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/20/544266880/
confederate-statues-were-built-to-further-a-white-supremacist-future.
292. See id.; Squires, supra note 290.
293. See Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REv. 263, 280 (2009) ("[T]here
is a public interest in destroying the monument to symbolically repudiate the racist past.
Destroying it would also avoid the risk of spreading its hateful message or seeming to
endorse it.").
294. See Keisha N. Blain, Destroying Confederate Monuments Isn't "Erasing" History.
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executive order to prosecute those who destroy confederate
monuments.295
International norms clearly defined under ATS, such as torture and
extrajudicial killing, are undoubtedly easier to define than the
destruction of cultural heritage. With the destruction of cultural
heritage, there are occasions where mitigating factors take the
destruction out of the tortious realm. For example, in June 2020,
protestors in Bristol destroyed the statute of Edward Colston, a nefarious
British slave trader.296 The destruction of this statue can be argued to be
a reclamation of agency for the ancestors of oppressed slaves and a
condemnation of the figure's racist past. However, many citizens believe
this action to be a vilification of their history and culture.297 William
Dalrymple, a recognized Scottish historian and writer, compared the
destruction of the Edward Colston statute to the Taliban's bombing of the
Bamiyan Buddhas in 2001.298 Under the former circumstance, however,
an ATS claim should not be plausible due to the oppressive symbolism
attached to the statue.
The classification of the destruction of cultural heritage within an
ATS framework must be viewed in a context broader than the historical
relevance of an object. It is similarly important to think outside an
imperialist view of cultural heritage and to instead place focus on the
purpose for which the object or monument was created. The definition of
cultural heritage should be examined through an "oppressor-oppressee"
paradigm. The destruction of objects which symbolize the message of an
oppressor should serve as an exemption, not only as to how we define
cultural heritage, but also as to how the objects are treated under
international and national cultural heritage laws.
295.Exec. Order No. 13933, 85 Fed. Reg. 40,081 (July 2, 2020) (stating that
destructions of confederate monuments are "criminal acts" and calling for the Attorney
General to prioritize prosecutions based on these matters).
296. Aditya Iyer, A Toppled Statue in Bristol Reveals Limited Understandings of What
Decolonizing Requires, HYPERALLERGIC (June 10, 2020) https://hyperallergic.com/570444/
toppled-statue-in-bristol-limited-understanding-of-decolonizing/.
297. See Mark Landler, In an English City, an Early Benefactor Is Now "a Toxic Brand,"
N.Y. TIMEs (June 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/14/world/europe/Bristol-
Colston-statue-slavery.html (quoting Mayor Marvin Rees of Bristol: "Some people are
saying, 'Colston is Bristol, and therefore Colston is me. And if you take that statue down,
you're taking something of me down."').
298. Iyer, supra note 296. In 2001, the Taliban government destroyed the great rock
sculptures of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan. Francesco Francioni & Federico
Lenzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and International Law, 14 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 619, 619-20 (2003). The Buddhas were located on the Taliban's "territory" and seen
as part of the ancient pre-Islamic past. Id. at 620.
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The destruction of property by an "oppressee" from the Western
perspective has, categorically, been seen as a political symbol, as opposed
to a violation of international law. For example, the destruction of the
Berlin Wall by civilian East and West Germans is still notable as a
symbol of the fall of communism in the Eastern Bloc.
299 After Ukraine's
independence, thousands of statues of Vladimir Lenin were destroyed,
serving as another symbol of the fall of communism.
00 In 2003, the
toppling of the large Saddam Hussein statue by civilian Iraqis and
American troops served as an iconic symbol of celebration of the U.S.
invasion and the ousting of an authoritative regime.
30 1 The potent
symbolic power of the destruction of oppressive symbols must be
considered in tandem with any claim brought under ATS.
However, for the most part, individuals bringing claims under ATS
for destruction of cultural heritage will likely bring a claim against the
oppressor. In recent decades, the international community has made a
point to condemn destruction of cultural heritage by oppressors, or
groups labeled terrorists or extremists.30 2 For example, in the case of
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, was the leader of the
ISIS-affiliated jihadist group, Hesbah, whose purpose was to impose its
ideology on the people of Timbuktu.303 In his quest to eliminate local
resident and pilgrim places for prayer, Al Mahdi destroyed ten religious
and historical monuments in Timbuktu, Mali.304 The U.N. Security
Council condemned these actions, and as stated above, Al Mahdi was
299. E. Perot Bissell V, Monuments to the Confederacy and the Right to Destroy in
Cultural-Property Law, 128 YALE L.J. 1130, 1151 (2019); see also Katrin Bennhold, The Fall
of the Berlin Wall in Photos: An Accident of History That Changed the World, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 11/09/world/berlin-wall-photos-30-year-anniversary.html
(Nov. 9, 2019).
300. Bissell, supra note 299, at 1151.
301. Id. But see Max Fisher, The Truth About Iconic 2003 Saddam Statue-Toppling, ATL.
(Jan. 3, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/01/the-truth-about-
iconic-2003-saddam-statue-toppling/342802/ (suggesting that images from the scene
misrepresented its import).
302. See UNESCO Director-General of UNESCO Calls for a Halt to Destruction of
Cultural Heritage Site in Timbuktu, UNESCO (June 30, 2012), http://whc.unesco.org/en/
news/901/; Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on
Destruction of Cultural Heritage, Executions in Palmyra, U.N. Press Release SC/12690
(Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12690.doc.htm; Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Condemns Destruction, Smuggling of Cultural Heritage by
Terrorist Groups, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2347 (2017), U.N. Press Release SC/
12764 (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12764.doc.htm.
303. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 33
(Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.icc-epi.int/courtrecords/cr2016_O7244.pdf.
304. Id. ¶¶ 34-38.
573
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2
ultimately convicted of war crimes.305  Groups like ISIS-the
oppressors-use the destruction of monuments to incite violence and
hate, to propagandize their power, and to eradicate rival religious
systems.306 This destruction of cultural heritage as a manifestation of
oppression is the key distinction to cognizability under ATS.
The categorization of cultural heritage within the ATS context
invariably exists along a spectrum, and if a case is brought under ATS,
courts must recognize the distinction. For example, the Taliban
destroyed the Bamiyan Buddhas because they saw them as an affront to
their religious values, while the international community saw the
Buddhas as part of universal heritage.307 The content of a piece of
property, while important, should also be considered by courts in
conjunction with the identity of those destroying it. A recent U.N. Report
noted that "[c]ultural heritage is to be understood as the resources
enabling the cultural identification and development processes of
individuals and groups, which they, implicitly or explicitly, wish to
transmit to future generations."308 The oppressee should be the appraiser
of the future of objects which were erected to support systematic
repression of the protected group. Conversely, the oppressor should be
held liable for acts that destroy the heritage of the oppressee as a
protected group. ATS is an appropriate vehicle to hold the oppressor
civilly liable for acts of oppression through the destruction of cultural
heritage.
VI. PERSONHOOD OF CULTURAL HERITAGE: WHY THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE?
The resounding justification for the creation and enforcement of
cultural heritage protection statutes and conventions focuses on the
universal value of these objects, monuments, and sites.309 The 1954
305. Id. ¶162-63; UNESCO Director-General of UNESCO Calls for a Halt to Destruction
of Cultural Heritage Site in Timbuktu, supra note 302.
306. See Christopher W. Jones, Understanding ISIS's Destruction of Antiquities as a
Rejection of Nationalism, 6 J. E. MEDITERRANEAN ARCHAEOLOGY & HERITAGE STUD. 31, 31-
32 (2018).
307. See Francioni & Lenzerini, supra note 298, at 625.
308. Karima Bennoune (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights), Rep. of the
Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, 11, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/31/59 (Feb. 3,
2016).
309. See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage pmbl., Nov. 16, 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 ("Considering that parts of the cultural
or natural heritage are of outstanding interest and therefore need to be preserved as part
of the world heritage of mankind as a whole ... "). But see Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
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Hague Convention enforces the idea of cultural heritage as part of the
global collective:
[D]amage to cultural property belonging to any people
whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all
mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture
of the world; . . . [T]he preservation of the cultural heritage is of
great importance for all peoples of the world and ... it is
important that this heritage should receive international
protection.310
Many of these international instruments belie the immense
importance that cultural heritage symbolizes to the specific individuals,
regions, and communities from which they originate. While it is certainly
true that cultural heritage holds universal significance, its impact must
be scrutinized on a smaller scale and from a post-colonial point of view.
311
Concepts of cultural identity, history, and religion are inculcated into
a group's personhood through cultural heritage. Cultural heritage is used
to cement the group's legacy, memories, physical places, objects and
intangible beliefs, and practices even after death. For example, in Spain,
the Monastery and Site of El Escorial, Madrid, one of the most important
architectural monuments in Spain's history, also serves as the burial site
of the kings and queens of Spain and members of its royal families.312 In
Iran, Isfahan, once the capital of Persia and one of the most historically
important Islamic centers, is still a place for political, commercial, social,
and religious activities for Iranian citizens.313 In Russia, the Red Square
is an integral part of Russian cultural life, utilized for large-scale military
parades, rock concerts, festivals and other events.314 John Moustakas,
while sympathizing with "cultural nationalism," reiterated the nexus
between a cultural object and a group's personhood:
Property pmbl., Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 ("[C]ultural property constitutes one of the
basic elements of civilization and national culture, and that its true value can be
appreciated only in relation to the fullest possible information regarding its origin, history
and traditional setting ... ").
310. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 16, at pmbl.
311. While not the topic of this paper, it is important to understand the contrasting views
of cultural heritage from a "cultural nationalism" versus "cultural internationalism" point
of view. See generally John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural
Property, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 831 (1986).
312. El Escorial Monastery, EL ESCORIAL, https://el-escorial.com/ (last visited Apr. 7,
2021).
313. Andrew Lawler, Isfahan: Iran's Hidden Jewel, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 2009),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/isfahan-irans-hidden-jewel-116221512/.
314. A Brief History of Red Square, RuSS. NAT'L TOURIST OFF., https://
www.visitrussia.org.uk/blog/a-brief-history-of-red-square/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
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[T]he term property for personhood might describe property so
closely bound up with our individual identities that its loss
"causes pain that cannot be relieved by the object's replacement"
.... Some property can be essential to the preservation of group
identity and group self-esteem.315
The collectivity of a group, be it territorially, historically, racially,
ethnically, or culturally bounded, possesses an undisputed interest in its
cultural heritage that becomes synonymous with its identity.316 Cultural
heritage, either tangible or intangible, becomes intrinsic in an
individual's being, infused into a person's traits, such as personality,
disposition, and behaviors. Through this conscious or unconscious
outlook on cultural heritage, any attack on this heritage is an affront to
an individual's being and identity.
The above begs the question as to whether the American courts
should be a vehicle used to punish those culpable of attacks on individual
and collective personhood, specifically of cultural heritage. As articulated
by the court in Sosa, "Congress did not intend the ATS to sit on the shelf
until some future time when it might enact further legislation."317
Although ATS cases certainly trigger foreign policy concerns, there are
multiple arguments that favor the use of ATS as a vehicle to civilly
prosecute destruction of cultural heritage claims. The utilization of ATS
allows a foreign victim of the destruction of cultural heritage to sue a
foreign defendant in federal court. The use of the U.S. court system offers
a myriad of advantages favorable to plaintiffs including the right to a jury
trial, availability of punitive remedies, forum selection, availability of
contingency fees, extensive discovery process, and, of course, adversarial
nature of the American court system.318
International tribunals have failed to effectively deter individuals
from the direction of fatal force against cultural heritage. There is no
315. John Moustakas, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict
Inalienability, 74 CoRNELL L. REV. 1179, 1184-85 & n.17 (1989) (quoting Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982)).
316. Coombe, supra note 289, at 264 (quoting Richard Handler, Who Owns the Past?
History, Cultural Property, and the Logic of Possessive Individualism, in BRE'Tr WILLIAMs,
THE POLITIcS OF CULTURE 63, 66 (1991) ("[I]t is our culture and history, which belong to us
alone, which make us what we are, which constitute our identity and assure our survival
... [I]ts identity or objective oneness over time, depends on the secure possession of a
culture . . . [and] culture and history become synonymous because the group's history is
preserved and embodied in material objects--cultural property.").
317. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
318. See, e.g., John R. Wilson, Note, Coming to America to File Suit: Foreign Plaintiffs
and the Forum Non Conveniens Barrier in Transnational Litigation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 659,
668 (2004).
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uniform mechanism to penalize individuals civilly for such offenses. On
a practical level, the purely jurisdictional view of ATS would not change
with its application to the protection of cultural heritage. Any claimant
would have to satisfy the Supreme Court's heightened requirements
under Kiobel in order to be afforded jurisdiction under the statute.
319
However, the United States is well-suited to exercise the "traditional
objectives of tort law, deterrence and compensation."
320 Victims of
cultural heritage offenses can be recompensed with compensatory and
punitive damages. While a monetary award cannot possibly remedy the
destruction of a piece of culture, economic recovery can serve as
affirmation of the suffering caused by the offender's transgressions and,
in the process, deter individual actors from future wrongdoings.
As sites continue to be destroyed in Iraq and Syria, ATS can also be
used as a conduit to the further development of customary international
law by uniformly and unambiguously forbidding the destruction of
cultural heritage.321 To date, international instruments have left it up to
states to enforce violations of the prohibitions against destruction.
322
Such autonomy implies that individual states must institute their own
remedies. If international law accords such enforcement to individual
countries, "every nation has a duty not only to enforce human rights
norms in its own backyard, but also to ensure that human rights are
respected globally." 323
Of course, the omnipresent question that undoubtedly plagues the
mind of the reader is whether American courts are able to decide the
rights of foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants. The plain language
of ATS confers jurisdiction over foreign plaintiffs for disputes that
occurred outside of the United States. The drafters of the Constitution
specifically empowered Congress with the ability to "define and punish
... Offences against the Law of Nations."324 Congress took advantage of
such empowerment with the creation of ATS. Since its enactment,
Congress has not amended ATS to take the judiciary out of this equation.
Although the Supreme Court has curtailed the ability of many potential
plaintiffs to sustain a successful claim in federal court, the preservation
319. See supra Section II.A.
320. Harold Hongju Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism
Through Transnational Public Law Litigation, 50 TEX. INT'L L.J. 661, 675 (2016).
321. See supra text accompanying notes 315-16 (explaining that civil remedies for
terrorism serve larger objectives of tort and public international law).
322. Michael C. Small, Note, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Federal
Courts: The Alien Tort Statute and the Separation of Powers, 74 GEO. L.J. 163, 178 (1985).
323. Id.
324. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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of ATS is indicative of a fundamental desire for it to remain a crucial part
of human rights litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
ATS serves as a gateway to federal jurisdiction, allowing a foreign
plaintiff who has been a victim of a tort committed in violation of
international law to pursue remedies in U.S. district courts. As
articulated by this Article, the prohibition against the destruction of
cultural heritage is universal and obligatory, forming part of the law of
nations. International law has evolved to encompass a broad range of
human rights norms, including the protection and prohibition against the
destruction of cultural heritage. While the scope of ATS human rights
litigation is narrow, the opinion in Jane W. v. Thomas offers a beacon of
hope that ATS may be a device to effectively hold accountable and deter
those individuals that commit wanton damage to and destruction of
cultural heritage.
Motivated by radical xenophobia, patriotism, or religion,
perpetrators of such attacks resort to cultural destruction in order to
erase any discernable trace of a group's culture, history, identity, or
religion. Recent examples of the catastrophic destruction of cultural
heritage have triggered the necessity to create remedies for individuals
and groups that are subject to such attacks. Although civil remedies are
not an elixir to cure the damages caused by such destruction, they may
reinforce public confidence in the rule of law and offer victims monetary
redress. Only when the United States works toward protecting the
dignity and integrity of cultural groups can it truly call itself the bastion
of liberty and justice.
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